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Today's system of litigation is vastly different than the one envisioned
by the 1938 reformers of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (the Rules).
Instead of quick, simple discovery, the process often subsumes litigation;
instead of a culminating trial on the merits, most cases end in settlement.
In light of the changes in today's litigation system, some legal critics
suggest an overhaul of the entire system.1 Others suggest more discrete
reforms. 2 One means of reform is to require more of pleading. Conley's
notice pleading standard required very little of a complaint, but in the recent
cases of Bell Atlantic v. Twombly 3 and Ashcroft v. Iqbal,4 the Supreme
Court reformed the pleading standard to require a complaint to state a
plausible claim for relief. This pleading standard now requires more of a
complaint and functions as a screen for unmeritorious suits.
Legal literature has largely criticized these cases arguing, among other
things, that (i) the Court is not the right entity to change the pleading
standard, (ii) plausibility pleading is contrary to the Rules because it
conflates the pleading standard with the summary judgment standard, (iii) it
will weed out meritorious cases, and (iv) it provides judges with too much
discretion. This article sets forth an account of plausibility pleading that
addresses these critiques. Under this new pleading standard, a complaint
must contain non-conclusory, factual allegations that, when considered with
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1. See Jay Tidmarsh, Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513 (2005-2006).

2. See Geoffrey P. Miller, PreliminaryJudgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165 (2010) (proposing a system
in which the judge gives a preliminary judgment on the merits earlier in the litigation and save costly
discovery until after the preliminary merits determination); Randy J. Kozel & David Rosenberg, Solving
the Nuisance-Value Settlement Problem: Mandatory Summary Judgment, 90 VA. L. REV. 1849 (2004)
(advocating for mandatory summary judgment).
3. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
4. 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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the narrative of the complaint as a whole, are not only sufficient to pass
summary judgment (if ultimately proven true after discovery), but also tell a
realistic story of wrongdoing.
Given the landscape of today's litigation system, plausibility pleading
represents a desired effort to bring judicial oversight of pleadings in line
with the changing legal conditions since 1938 reforms. Adapting this
standard helps preserve the stated goal of the Rules reforms to provide swift
resolution of cases on their merits and rids the system of frivolous suits
early.
Part I of the article describes the vision of the 1938 reformers and the
changes to the litigation landscape since. Part II describes the Twombly and
Iqbal cases in relation to prior pleading standards. Part III builds on
Twombly and Iqbal's language to set forth an account of plausibility
pleadings that addresses the problems with today's system of litigation.
Part IV describes some of the major critiques to plausibility pleading and
explains why these critiques do not pose a threat to the account of
plausibility pleading set forth in Part III.
PART 1:

THE REALITY OF THE LITIGATION WORLD

The 1938 reformers who brought about the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure sought to cure the procedure-heavy common law system in
which meritorious suits were dismissed because of technicalities. 5 Roscoe
Pound and his fellow drafters argued that procedure should not prevent a
suit from decision on the merits 6 and envisioned a process by which the
merits of the case would be revealed through broad discovery and
ultimately determined in a trial.7 The goal was a just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action. 8 One of the underlying
assumptions necessitating creation of the Rules was that the major risks in
civil litigation emerged from premature dismissal of meritorious claims
brought by unsophisticated parties. 9
The reformers sought broad discovery as a means to facilitate disposition
of a case on its merits in which the facts underlying each case would be

5. Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 526.
6. See id. at 527 (explaining Pound's ideas and their relationship to the 1938 procedural reforms).
7. See Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 498-99 (1910) (an
implicit assumption of the Federal Rules is a single culminating trial).
8. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
9. Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised)
Summary Judgment, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 61, 97 (2007).
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revealed to both sides. However, the Rules' extreme focus on substance
and a case's potential merit has brought its own problems 10 as the landscape
of litigation has changed tremendously since 1938.11 The recognition of
new rights and the extent and nature of discovery have profoundly changed
the litigation process such that the foremost vision of the reformers is no
longer realized.
Today, less than two percent of all filed civil cases reach trial 12 and the
number continues to drop. 13 "[F]our-fifths of the claims that enter the
litigation system exit through non-litigation processes. ' 14 "Despite this
reality, our procedural system is [still] structured around the belief that a
case will be resolved at a culminating, all-issues jury trial." 15
One change since the time of the reformers, and a major reason for the
16
disappearance of trials, is the sheer number of cases in the justice system.
The recognition of new rights of action has led to a considerable increase in
the volume of litigation seeking access to the federal courts as compared to
those in 1938.17 In the 1960s, powerful political movements strengthened,
and public interest organizations began to lobby and demonstrate on behalf
of numerous causes. 18 In response to these entities' demand for change,
10. See Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 550 ("[T]he cure has caused other diseases, such as cost, delay,
disuniformity in application of procedural rules, perceived variability in outcomes, and the attendant
dissatisfaction with our procedural system.").
11. Epstein, supra note 9, at 97 ('The current provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
designed in an earlier era for litigation that on average has been far simpler than litigation today.").
12. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federaland
State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 459 (2004) ("The portion of federal civil cases resolved
by trial fell from 11.5 percent in 1962 to 1.8 percent in 2002, continuing a long historic decline.");
Thomas H. Cohen, Federal Tort Trials and Verdicts, 2002-2003, BUREAU JUST. STAT. BuLL. 3 (Aug.
2005) (reporting an eighty percent decline in federal tort trials between 1985 and 2003); Judith Resnik,
Procedureas Contract,80 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 593, 616 (2005) (explaining that even though the total
disposition of cases has risen tremendously, the absolute number of trials has decreased and "a full trial
on the merits has become a rare event.") (internal quotation omitted).
13. Royal Furgeson, Civil Jury Trials RIP.? Can it Actually Happen in America?, 40 ST. MARY'S L. J.
795, 797 (2009) (arguing civil jury trials have been declining steadily for the last thirty years and may
eventually become extinct); see also Galanter, supra note 12 at 460.
14. Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 549; see also Resnik, supra note 12, at 597 ("The practices of
adjudication, however, have shifted... alternative dispute resolution (ADR) or dispute resolution (DR)
increasingly dominates the landscape of procedure.").
15. Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 549.
16. Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Distorted Mirror: The Supreme Court's Shimmering View of Summary
Judgment, Directed Verdict, and the Adjudication Process, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 95, 96 (1988) ("As almost
anyone alive during the past decade knows, this is the era of the 'litigation explosion[.]'); see also
Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 275 (1982) (arguing courts are
overburdened because parties turn to courts to resolve disputes instead of the institutions to which they
turned in the past such as church or family).
17. See ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW, 36-7 (Harvard

University Press 2001).
18. See id.
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representatives in Congress and the judiciary created new causes of action. 19
Standing to sue governmental agencies became broader as new legal rights
20
and obligations arose.
During this time, both state and federal judiciaries implemented major
changes to the law. The Supreme Court expanded the legal rights of
prisoners, welfare recipients, and criminal defendants with its "due process
revolution. '21 State courts reformed tort law, making it easier for those
injured to sue and obtain substantial damage awards from doctors,
landlords, manufacturers, and municipal governments. 22 Congressional
statutes and judicial decisions also rendered legal services for those who
could not afford representation and public defender offices for criminal
defendants. 23 From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, federal and state
legislators enacted numerous regulatory statutes dealing with
nondiscrimination in both education and employment, pollution control,
land use, and consumer protection. In conjunction with these changes,
federal and state governments enacted new approaches to regulatory
enforcement that allowed officials and private individuals to enforce the
new laws.24
Consequently, dispositions of cases in the United States have risen
tremendously from 50,000 in 1962 to 258,000 in 2002,25 and litigation in
the United States is now more popular than in any other developed
countries. 26
Federal appellate cases involving constitutional issues
increased sevenfold between 1960 and 1980.27 Even the number of lawyers
has doubled between 1960 and 1995.28 The number of judges in the federal
system, however, has not kept pace with the increased caseload. 29 Thus, the

19. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (2006); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2006).
20. See KAGAN, supra note 17.
21. Id.at37.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.at 37-38.
25. Galanter, supra note 12.
26. Derek C. Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUc. 570, 571 (1983)
(arguing that the United States has a greater proportion of lawyers and lawsuits than other industrialized
countries and suggesting Americans rely too much on litigation to resolve disputes).
27. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 36.
28. Id.
29. Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues and Casual Vices inthe Federal Courts
of Appeal,66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 685, 687 (2001) ("[T]he federal bench, both district and appellate, has
grown as its caseload has expanded, although the former growth has not matched the latter."); see also
William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem
for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 274 n.3 (1996) (citing materials that
document the increase in judicial caseload).
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caseload per judge is substantially higher today than it was in 1938, and as a
result, courts have sought effective means to lessen their caseload. 30 Courts

often focus on case management through dispositive pretrial motions,
instead of resolution on the merits, in order to manage their dockets. Not
only has the number of cases increased, but both criminal and civil trials
31
today are larger in scope and duration than in the 1930s.
Another legal development that added to the breadth of cases since the
1938 reforms is the prevalence of aggregate litigation.
The 1966
amendments to the Rules brought about the possibility of class-wide
litigation. 32 If a class is certified, the suit will likely result in a massive
33
settlement and could cost the defendant hundreds of millions of dollars.
Defendants may, therefore, be willing to settle an individual plaintiff's case,
34
whether meritorious or not, to prevent exposure to a potential class action.
The second major change since the dawn of the Rules is in the extent and
nature of discovery. 35 At the time of the reformers, typical discovery
entailed "... a few interrogatory responses, a file folder (or perhaps a
banker's box) of documents, and one or two local depositions. '36 In civil
litigation of anything beyond the simplest sort of dispute, It is simply no
37
longer the case that discovery involves just a small file of documents.

30. See Stephen C. Yeazell, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modem Civil Process, WIS. L. REV.
631, 638 (1994) (Judges are devoting less time to trials and more time to the litigation process);
Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 560 (arguing that case management has taken a life of its own, and dismissals
for failure to abide by court-imposed scheduling deadlines, issue narrowing requirements, and final
pretrial orders are too common); see also Judith Resnik, Competing and Complementary Rule Systems:
Civil Procedure and ADR: Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593, 597 (2005) (the
processes of mediation and arbitration used to be considered "extrajudicial" but have been brought into
the courts to deal with the increased caseload and are now considered "judicial").
31. KAGAN, supra note 17, at 36.
32. Richard A. Nagareda, Class Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof,84 N.Y.U.L. REV. 97, 98
(2009).
33. Id. ("With vanishingly rare exceptions, class certification sets the litigation on a path toward
resolution by way of settlement, not full-fledged testing of the plaintiffs' case by trial. In terms of their
real-world impact, class settlements can be quite significant, potentially involving dollar sums in the
hundreds of millions or requiring substantial restructuring of the defendant's operations.").
34. See Miller, supra note 2, at 166 ("Defendants claim they are forced to settle frivolous lawsuits for
exorbitant sums in order to avoid burdensome litigation expenditures or to limit their exposure to class
actions."); see also Ettie Ward, The After-Shocks of Twombly: Will We "Notice" Pleading Changes?, 82
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 892, 901 (2008) (acknowledging "the reality that litigation-especially in complex
multi-party or class action cases-has become significantly more expensive[.]").
35. See Rebecca Love Kourlis et al., ReinvigoratingPleadings, 87 Denv. U. L. Rev. 245, 253 (2010).
36. Id.
37. Id.
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38
Broad discovery is a unique feature of the American legal system.
While judges often drive the discovery process in other countries, the
American process is lawyer-driven and thus adversarial. 39 Rule 26(b)(1)
allows any discovery "relevant to the claim or defense of any party,"
including material that is inadmissible but "reasonably calculated to lead
to... admissible evidence. '40 On a showing of good cause, Rule 26(b)(1)
also allows additional "discovery of any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action. ' 41 This broad discovery facilitates a full
exchange of information that allows parties to obtain a more accurate
43
42
estimate of the case's value and likely outcome. In Hickman v. Taylor,
the Supreme Court explained that "the deposition-discovery rules are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment... [m]utual knowledge of all the
'44
relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation."

While broad discovery helps parties arrive at the facts underlying a case,
it has its costs. 45 One recent factor that has contributed to the extreme cost
46
of discovery today is the prevalence of electronic discovery (e-discovery).
Almost all information today is available electronically. 47 E-discovery
today requires each side to identify the laptops, smart-phones, memory
sticks, network servers, back-up devices, and logs from online service
providers that might contain data relevant to the case.48 All this information

38. Stephen N. Surbin, Discovery in Global Perspective:Are We Nuts?, 52 DEPAuL L. REV., 299, 30607 (2002-2003) ("[T]he number of discovery mechanisms available to the American lawyer as a matter
of right, the degree of party control over discovery, the extent to which liberal discovery in the United
States has become what almost looks like a constitutional right, and the massive use of discovery of all
kinds in a substantial number of cases surely set [the United States] apart."); see Samuel Issacharoff, The
Contents of Our Casebooks: Why Do Cases Get Litigated?, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1266, 1271 (2002)
(describing the scope of discovery as the most distinctive feature of American procedure).
39. Surbin, supra note 38, at 301 ("[T]wo of the biggest differences between civil law countries and the
United States with respect to pretrial discovery are the centrality of the judge.., and the continuity of
the proceedings.").
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
41. Id.
42. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 571 (6th ed. 2003).
43. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
44. Id. at 507.
45. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot be Optimal But Could Be Better: The Economics of
Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE LAW J. 889, 892 (2009) ("[I]n federal cases,
discovery comprises half of all litigation costs.").
46. Id. at 893-94 (describing the extreme cost of electronic discovery and explaining that e-discovery is
just a new instance of an old problem-technology facilitating more discovery, increasing existing
controversy over discovery costs.); Furgeson, supra note 13, at 818 ("[T]he problems of electronic
discovery now loom large over America's civil justice system, with no good answers presently in
sight.").
47. Kourlis et al., supra note 35, at 253 (asserting that ninety-nine percent of information generated
today is electronic and accessible to those who demand it).
48. See generally, id.
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is then indexed and reviewed by lawyers (who typically bill by the hour).49
With the use of computers and the Internet, both small and large businesses

have the capacity to preserve huge amounts of information. 50

In fact,

almost all cases today involve e-discovery, and cases involving big

corporations can require analyzing terabytes of information. 51 The potential
extent of civil discovery has expanded commensurately and, with it, the
associated cost of billable time spent simply culling through the available
52
information.
E-discovery has made the already crowded dockets and understaffed
courts even busier and will likely continue making things worse. 53 The cost
of exchanging electronically stored information is so high in some cases
that it exceeds the entire amount in controversy in the case. 54 Justice Breyer
expressed the concern that when ordinary cases face e-discovery costs in
the millions of dollars, many people are unable to afford litigation and
"justice is determined by wealth, not by the merits of the case." 55
Even though new Federal Rules took effect in 2006 that provide

guidelines for electronic data, they do not change the adversarial nature of
American law, which still allows plaintiffs and defendants to seek as much
information as they want from each other. 56 These realities of e-discovery
are simply inconsistent with Rule l's promise of the "just, speedy, and
'57
inexpensive determination of every action.
The nature of discovery has also changed since the time of the reformers.
Discovery used to be a relatively circumscribed search for the facts
underlying the case. Until the 1970s, few lawyers complained about
expense or delay resulting from abusive discovery. 58 However, beginning
in the mid-1970s it became clear that expense and delay resulting from

49. The big data dump; Technology, business and the law, ECONOMIST, August 30, 2008.
50. Electronic ties that bind; Software that spots hidden networks, ECONOMIST, June 27, 2009
(describing the exploding volume of electronic communication and estimating that corporate email
archives have grown by more than 40% per year).
51. The big data dump, supra note 49.
52. Id. ("In an ordinary case [involving Verizon], 200 lawyers can easily review electronic documents
for four months, at a cost of millions of dollars."); Kourlis et al., supra note 35, at 253 ("For many
lawyers and potential parties, an astonishing amount of information is technically available, but the cost
of completing discovery and moving to summary judgment or trial is simply prohibitive.").
53. The big data dump, supra note 49.
54. Kourlis et al., supra note 35, at 246.
55. The big data dump, supra note 49.
56. Id.
57. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
58. William W. Schwarzer, The FederalRules, The Adversary Process,and Discovery Reforms, 50 U.
PrrT. L. REv. 703, 704 (1989).
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discovery were prevalent. 59 Complaints about discovery are even louder
today as discovery has become a strategic exercise that contributes to the
frustration of the Rules' promise of speedy, inexpensive resolution of
60
cases.
Rises in the cost of discovery and the extreme cost of trials 61 have made
litigation prohibitively expensive for some litigants. 62 These costs have
also given parties (even those with weak cases) the power to make a
credible threat to impose extreme costs on the opposing party. 63 Because
settlements take into account the high cost of litigation, a lawsuit may
generate a settlement value, even where the expected recovery at trial may
have been nothing. 64 The ability to impose costs on one's opponent thus
becomes a strategic move in litigation that can shift the settlement zone in
one's favor. 65 The cost of discovery has also set the stage for the
possibility of plaintiffs filing frivolous suits aimed at extracting a settlement
from innocent defendants. 66 Because the upfront costs to the plaintiff are
59. Id.
60. Id. at 703 ("Discovery, originally conceived as the servant of the litigants to assist them in reaching
a just outcome, now tends to dominate the litigation and inflict disproportionate costs and burdens.
Often it is conducted so aggressively and abusively that it frustrates the objectives of the Federal
Rules.").
61. Furgeson, supra note 13, at 823 ("Discovery adds much to the cost of litigation, but it is not the only
culprit. Trials themselves can be hugely expensive.").
62. Kourlis et al., supra note 35, at 246 ("In many cases - particularly complex cases - discovery and
motion practice have become so expensive and burdensome that parties cannot afford adequate trial
preparation and instead are forced to settle regardless of merits.").
63. See AM. COLL.OF TRIAL LAW., INTERIM REP. & 2008 LITIG. SURV. OF THE FELLOWS OF THE AM.
COLL. OF TRIAL LAW. A-4 (2008) available at
http://www.du.edu/legalinstitute/pubs/Interim%2OReport%2OFinal%20for%20webl .pdf (seventy-one
percent of respondents to a survey of the American College of Trial Lawyers indicated their belief that
counsel use discovery as a tool to force settlement); see also Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse,
69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 636-37 (1989) (in some cases, the threat of discovery itself becomes a settlement
tool); Moss, supra note 45, at 895-96 (discussing the consensus among most economists, civil
proceduralists, and judges that discovery, given the prevalence of abuse, should be limited). But see
Stephen N. Surbin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the "One
Size Fits All" Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 392 (2010) (arguing that most cases do not have an
inordinate amount of discovery).
64. Issacharoff, supra note 38, at 1272 ("[T[he fact that parties face significant costs in the litigation
process expands the potential settlement zone and creates a greater possibility of mutually advantageous
settlement[.]"); see also Miller, supra note 2, at 167 ("We live in a 'world of settlements,' it is true, but
all is not right with this world.").
65. Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 637-38 (discussing that parties can take advantage of the exposure of
discovery through impositional requests). "[A]n impositional request is one justified by the costs it
imposes on one's adversary rather than by the gains to the requester derived from the contribution the
information will make to the accuracy of the judicial process." Id.
66. Ward, supra note 34, at 901 (referencing "the widespread perception that frivolous cases are
overwhelming the system and victimizing defendants[.]"); Kourlis et al., supra note 35, at 284 ('The
potential cost of discovery and motion practice ... may force defendants who are not at fault to settle
because doing so is less expensive than slogging through the broad discovery and motion practice
process."). But see Stempel, supra note 16, at 96 ("Although all agree that the absolute number of
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relatively low, but filing a complaint forces response costs on the defendant,
the innocent defendant can prevent accruing the costs of continuing with the
67
litigation by settling, even if the suit has no chance of prevailing at trial.
Frivolous litigation has thus increased the prevalence of settlement and
decreased the number of cases that actually reach trial.
The landscape of modem litigation is thus vastly different from that
reformed by the Rules in 1938. The focus on finding substance through
discovery has brought about a system in which frivolous litigation can
extract settlement. 68 The distant possibility that discovery may yield a
sliver of substance often prevents cases from being decided on the merits
when the cost of discovery and trial bring about settlement. Substance
today thus subsumes merit, as crafty litigants have the opportunity to take
69
advantage of the system.
Numerous changes to the Rules have been implemented to help curb
wasteful discovery. 70 One proposed solution aiming to combat some of the
problems with discovery is judicial regulation. 71 However, at the point of

lawsuits has increased in virtually every corner of the state and federal court systems, there exists
vigorous debate about whether the increase is unusual in relative or historical terms and even more
vigorous debate about whether the absolute increase in cases symbolizes the American concern for
fairness and justice or represents a surge in frivolous or trivial disputes needlessly clogging the courts.").
67. Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 2 at 1860 (describing a nuisance value settlement, in which a payoff
is extracted by a threat to litigate a meritless claim or defense that both parties know the court would
readily dismiss when reviewed on the merits).
68. Epstein, supra note 9, at 98 ("Now there is far greater peril of allowing frivolous litigation to go on
too long as well as a risk of cutting short meritorious litigation.").
69. See Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 515 ("[W]e never fully integrated procedure and substance. Instead,
we now have a system in which the importance of substance and procedure are inverted. Substance now
dominates procedure.").
70. In the 1970s, the American Bar Association and others campaigned for revisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. In 1980 Rule 26(f) was adopted to authorize judicially supervised discovery
conferences. In 1983, extensive amendments, including to Rules 11, 16, and 26, were passed to provide
judicial case management, discovery control, and the imposition of sanctions against discovery abuse
and frivolous litigation. The problems of frivolous suits and discovery abuse, nevertheless, persist. See
Schwarzer, supra note 58, at 704; see also Ward, supra note 30, at 913 (describing recent changes to the
Rules of Civil Procedure that curb discovery abuses); Surbin, supra note 38, at 313 ("[A]lmost all of the
amendments to the federal discovery rules during the past two decades have been in the direction of
restraining discovery[.]").
71. Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 639 n. 14 ("Rule 26(g), for example, requires the requester to make
only appropriate demands on pain of sanctions, and Rule 26(c) allows the court to trim back demands
for information on several grounds").
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discovery, judges do not have access to the information sought to truly
assess whether a discovery request is abusive or wasteful.72 The problems
73
of abusive discovery and inefficient settlements nevertheless persist.
If these regulations of discovery remain ineffective, the threat of
discovery may continue to allow parties with unmeritorious suits to extract
settlements. A better means to screen abusive discovery and the extraction
of socially inefficient settlements is to regulate cases at their onset. By
heightening the pleading standard, courts can bar the advancement of
unmeritorious suits such that they do not pose a credible threat of imposing
discovery costs.
PART II: TWOMBLY AND IQBAL

Before the promulgation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
common law dictated pleading. 74 The former system allowed for successive
rounds of pleading that aimed at reducing the dispute to a single issue of
fact or law; 75 however, the common law approach system was not only slow
and expensive, but it also became so technical that many parties lost
meritorious cases because of small procedural mistakes. 76 Common law
pleading was eventually replaced with code pleading, which emphasized
developing facts through the pleadings. 77 Code pleading required the

72. See Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 638 (explaining how judges cannot detect abusive discovery
where they lack essential information to determine if a discovery request is abusive); Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 560 n.6 (2007) ("We cannot prevent what we cannot detect; we cannot detect
what we cannot define; we cannot define 'abusive' discovery except in theory, because in practice we
lack essential information.").
73. See Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck, & Stephen B. Burbank, Plausible Denial: Should Congress
Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?, 158 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 141, 157 (2009) ("As a matter of
practice, since broad discovery began, discovery rules have been amended repeatedly (Rule 26 in 1980,
1983, 1987, 1993, 2000, and 2006) without noticeable success[.]"); see also Lee H. Rosenthal, From
Roles of Procedureto How Lawyers Litigate: 'Twixt the Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV., 227,
229-30 (2010) (describing the changes to the rules and their failure to correct the problems of abusive
discovery).
74. Ward, supra note 34, at 897.
75. Id. at 896.
76. See id. at 896-97 ("In practice, the system came to be considered a mere series of traps and pitfalls
for the unwary-an impediment to justice that must be abolished. The common law pleading system
also proved to be excruciatingly slow, expensive, and unworkable and better calculated to vindicate
highly technical pleading rules than it was to dispense justice.") (internal quotations omitted).
77. Id. at 897.
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plaintiff to plead "ultimate" facts, but did not permit the plaintiff to plead
"evidentiary" facts or "conclusions of law. '78 This system was also
79
criticized for bringing about great delay and expense.

The 1938 reformers hoped to distance themselves from the earlier
systems in which procedure dominated substance,80 and instead, bring the
focus back to the merit of the suit by simplifying pleading.8 1 Rule 1 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the goal of the Rules is "to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding. '8 2 Charles Clark, the chief drafter of the Rules, envisioned the
ultimate goals of the Rules to be a focus on the merits of the suit and quick
83
and efficient resolution of cases.

Rule 8(a)(2) requires a plaintiff's complaint to contain a "short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. ' 84 The
Rules authorize dismissal of a lawsuit where the complaint "fails to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted. 8 5 The Rules, however, do not

explain how "short" or "plain" the statement may be. Moreover, they do
not describe how detailed a complaint must be for a pleader to show that
she "is entitled to relief.

'8 6

The founders initially understood the sole function of the complaint as
giving the defendant fair notice of the general nature of the dispute.8 7 The

78. Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 57 (2010); Charles E. Clark,
Simplified Pleadings,2 F.R.D. 456, 460 (1943).
79. Id. (describing code pleading as "at best wasteful, inefficient, and time-consuming.").
80. Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 514. In England, and eventually America, the focus was not on the
substantive right that was violated but on the procedural attributes that the plaintiff had to assert. Id.
81. Id. at 515. Roscoe Pound advocated for a system in which "[p]rocedural rules were general,
discretionary guidelines placed in the hands of judges whose scientific administration would lead to the
just determination of each case." Id. See Ward, supra note 34, at 896 ("The stated goal of the Federal
Rules was to facilitate reaching the merits of disputes[.]"). See also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48
(1957) ("The Federal Rules reject the approach that pleading is a game of skill in which one misstep by
counsel may be decisive to the outcome and accept the principle that the purpose of pleading is to
facilitate a proper decision on the merits."); Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002)
("The liberal notice pleading of Rule 8(a) is the starting point of a simplified pleading system, which
was adopted to focus litigation on the merits of a claim.").
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see Steven S. Gensler, Justness! Speed! Inexpense!: An Introduction to The
Revolution of 1938 Revisited: The Role of the Federal Rules, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 271 (2008)
(arguing that Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states the goal of civil procedure reform).
83. Kourlis et al., supra note 35, at 284.
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
85. FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6).
86. FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
87. See Clark, supra note 78 at 460-61 ('The notice in mind is rather that of the general nature of the
case and the circumstances or events upon which it is based, so as to differentiate it from other acts or
events, to inform the opponent of the affair or transaction to be litigated... and to tell the court of the
broad outlines of the case."); see also Robert G. Bone, Plausibility PleadingRevisited and Revised: A
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Supreme Court's initial interpretation of the vague language in Rule 8
reflected this understanding. In Conley v. Gibson,88 the Supreme Court held
that a complaint should not be dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt
that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which
would entitle him to relief." 89 Following the Conley decision, this case was
understood as prescribing the proper standard for pleading and coined the
term "notice pleading." 90 Because notice pleading required little of a
complaint, cases were rarely dismissed at the pleading phase.91 Notice
92
pleading was brought into question by various scholars and lower courts,
but the Supreme Court did not reconsider it until 2007.
In the 2007 case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 the Supreme Court
retired the Conley standard. The Court considered the sufficiency of a
complaint in an antitrust class action alleging that telecommunications
providers had entered into an agreement not to compete and to forestall
competitive entry in violation of the Sherman Act. 94 Under Section 1 of the
Sherman Act, each Incumbent Local Exchange Carrier (ILEC), regional
service monopoly, had an obligation to share its network with competitors
known as Competitive Local Exchange Carriers (CLECs). 95 Antitrust law
had long insisted that independent parallel conduct, and even conscious
96
identical conduct, is not illegal when the competitors have no agreement.
The complaint based its allegations of an unlawful agreement on two
facts: 97 (1) that the ILECs did not compete in each other's markets, and (2)
that the ILECs' exhibited parallel conduct for purposes of preventing
Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 853 (2010).
88. 355 U.S. 41(1957).
89. Id. at 45-46.
90. A. Benjamin Spencer, PlausibilityPleading,49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 434 (2008) ("Since the enactment
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, notice pleading has been the watchword for the system
of pleading in federal civil courts.").
91. See Surbin, supra note 38, at 311-12 (describing the difficultly of obtaining a dismissal for failure
to state a claim given the dearth of detail required in the complaint); see also Stempel, supra note 16, at
98 ("The liberal pleading standards of rules 8 and 9, as interpreted by leading cases made rule 12(b)(6)
dismissals difficult to achieve, at least when courts adhere to the letter and spirit of the Supreme Court's
pronouncements in the area.").
92. See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading,81 Tex. L. Rev. 551, 551 (2002) ("Despite [the]
clarity [of Rule 8] and the Supreme Court's endorsement of notice pleading in Conley v. Gibson, federal
courts have embraced heightened pleading burdens in a variety of situations.") (internal citations
omitted); Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, DestablizingSystems 95 IOWA L.
REV. 821, 849 (2010) ("Even before Twombly, some had criticized notice pleading as excessively lax.").
93. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) (prohibiting "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise,
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce[.]").
95. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.
96. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 92, at 826.
97. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.
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competition from CLECs within their local markets. 98 In a 7-2 decision, the
Court held that the complaint failed to state a claim. 99 The Court, in an
opinion written by Justice Souter, accepted as true the allegations of parallel
conduct, but found that parallel conduct alone was inadequate to show that
the plaintiffs were entitled to relief because they did not make plausible
allegations as to an agreement. 100
The Court reasoned that while the pleading standard announced by Rule
8 does not require "detailed factual allegations," it demands more than a
"formulaic recitation" of the elements of the cause of action. 10 1 Nor does a
complaint suffice if it tenders "naked assertion[s]" devoid of "further
factual enhancement. ' 10 2 The Court found that Rule 8(a)(2)'s "short plain
statement" requires the complaint state a plausible claim, not just raise the
possibility that the claim has merit. 10 3 According to the Court's
interpretation, "[a]sking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does
not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls
for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal
'10 4
evidence of illegal agreement.
The Court explained that a claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference
that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. 10 5 When a complaint
pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it "stops
short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to
10 7
relief.' '10 6 The Court thus retired Conley's no set of facts test.

98. Id. at 551.
99. Id. at 548-49.
100. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564 ("[T]he complaint leaves no doubt that the plaintiffs rest their
§ 1 claim
on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any independent allegation of actual agreement among the
ILCEs.").
101. Id. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).
102. Id. at 557.
103. Id. ("[F]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above a speculative level.").
104. Id. at 556.
105. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
106. Id. at 557 (brackets omitted).
107. The Court expressly rejected that it moved to a heightened pleading standard. "[W]e do not
require heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The term "heightened pleading" has been invoked about this topic in
various contexts, but remains ambiguous. The Supreme Court here seemed to use the term "heightened"
in reference to the Federal Rules- as long as plausibility pleading is consistent with the rules, it is not
"heightened" in this sense. Some scholars, however, refer to plausibility pleading as "heightened" in
reference to Conley; plausibility pleading requires more of a complaint than notice pleading, thus
plausibility pleading may be "heightened" in this sense. Because the various meanings for the term have
different implications about the permissibility of plausibility pleading, this article will not refer to
plausibility pleading as "heightened."
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The Court relied on the writings of Judges Easterbrook and Posner to
express its concern over abusing the cost of discovery to bring frivolous
claims and emphasized the need to weed out weak claims early. 10 8 The
Court observed that the success of judicial supervision in checking
discovery abuse has been "on the modest side,"10 9 and summary judgment
is inadequate to weed out unmeritorious claims because "the threat of
discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even
anemic cases before reaching those proceedings." '110
The Court concluded that the allegations in the complaint did not
plausibly suggest an illicit accord, because the allegations were not only
compatible with, but indeed were more likely explained by, lawful,
unchoreographed free-market behavior.1 Conspiracy allegations must
1 12
include evidence tending to exclude the possibility of independent action.
Contrary to the plaintiff's argument, the Court reasoned that the behavior of
the ILECs could simply be explained by each entity's rationally competitive
nature to act in its own best interests.113 The conduct alleged was thus
exactly what one would expect from a competitive telecommunications
market.
In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the Court's concern about the
expense of antitrust litigation can be resolved by "careful case management,
including strict control of discovery, [and] careful scrutiny of evidence at
the summary judgment stage[.]" 11 4 He reasoned that the concerns about the
cost of discovery do not merit a rejection of the Conley standard.11 5
Stevens' dissent looked to the history of the Federal Rules, their aim to
limit the barriers blocking litigants from court, and their goal of resolving
11 6
cases on their merits.

108. Spencer, supra note 90 (arguing that a "troika" of policy concerns-litigation expense, discovery
abuse, and overburdened caseloads" underlie Twombly's plausibility standard).
109. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
110. Id. at 560 n.6 (reasoning that judicial case management will not work because "[a] judicial officer
does not know the details of the case the parties will present and in theory cannotknow the details. The
judicial officer always knows less than the parties ... Judicial officers cannot measure the cost and
benefits to the requester and so cannot isolate impositional requests. Requesters have no reason to
disclose their own estimates because they gain from imposing costs on rivals ... .
111. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
112. Id. at 554.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id. at 575 n.13 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The potential for 'sprawling, costly, and hugely timeconsuming' discovery is no reason to throw the baby out with the bathwater.") (internal citation
omitted).
116. Id. at 575 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Justice Stevens quoted Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in
Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 17 reasoning that motions to dismiss were
not the place to combat discovery abuse, and litigants must rely on
summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out meritorious claims
sooner rather than later. He cited Form 9, Complaint for Negligence, which
is included in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and explained how the
bare allegations there were sufficient under the standard set forth by the
Rules.11 8 Justice Stevens objected that the majority's standard for the
motion to dismiss at hand conflated pleading challenges into the summary
judgment standard and imposed an evidentiary standard to evaluate a
motion to dismiss. 119 According to Stevens, any change to the pleading
requirement should be made by the rulemaking process, and thus, not
unilaterally by the Court.1 20 Stevens argued that the Court's rejection of the
allegations as legal conclusions that do not receive the presumption of truth
was a return to code pleading. 121 He expressed concern about cases, like
Twombly, where much of the evidence is in the defendants' hands, even
122
surviving a motion to dismiss.
After Twombly, it remained unclear whether the plausibility standard
applied to all pleadings or only in the antitrust context. Two years later,
Ashcroft v. Iqba1123 clarified the confusion. In Iqbal, a Pakistani immigrant
alleged that former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft and current FBI
Director Robert Mueller unconstitutionally singled out Arab Muslims for
harsh confinement after the September 11th attacks based on their religion
124
and ethnicity.
The complaint stated that Ashcroft and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and
willfully and maliciously agreed to subject [the plaintiff] to harsh
conditions of confinement as a matter of policy, solely on account the
prohibited factors [religion, race, and/or national origin] and for no

117. 507 U.S. 163, 168-69 (1993).

118. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 576 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
119. Id.at 580.
120. Id. at 579 ("I would not rewrite the Nation's civil procedure textbooks and call into doubt the
pleading rules of most of its States without far more informed deliberation as to the costs of doing so.
Congress has established a process- a rulemaking process- for revisions of that order.").
121. Id.

122. Id. at 586-87.
123. 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1953 (2009).
124. Id. at 1942. The initial complaint named numerous other defendants, but the issue before the Court
involved only the allegations against Mueller and Ashcroft.

272

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIV:227

legitimate penological interest. ' 125 In addition, the claim alleged that
"Ashcroft was the policy's 'principal architect' and Mueller was
1' 26
'instrumental' in its adoption and execution.
The Supreme Court found that most of the factual allegations in the
complaint were either "conclusory" or implausible, 27 and thus the
complaint did not state a claim. The Court reasoned that the pleading
standard in this rule does not require "detailed factual allegations," but
demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
accusation. 128 Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertions
devoid of further factual enhancement. 129 Though Twombly determined the
sufficiency of an antitrust complaint, the Court explained that the decision
was based on its interpretation and application of Rule 8, which governs the
pleading standard "in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States
district courts. ' 130 Therefore, the Court clarified that the Twombly standard
applies to all cases.
The Court reasoned that two principles underlie the Twombly decision:
(1) a court need not accept as true legal conclusions;1 31 and (2) only a
complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to
dismiss. 132 The Court thus determined that a complaint has facial
plausibility when the plaintiff pleads sufficient factual content from which
the courts may reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the
1 33
misconduct alleged.
Because Mueller and Ashcroft raised the defense of qualified immunity,
and the Court refused to find Mueller and Ashcroft responsible for the
actions of the lower level officials under respondeat superior,Jqbal needed
to show that Mueller and Ashcroft themselves violated the Constitution. 134
The Court found that the allegations in the complaint did not establish
wrongdoing by Ashcroft and Mueller. Although purporting that Mueller
arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part of 9/11
investigations, which were approved by the FBI, demonstrated purposefully

125. Id. at 1939.
126. Id. at 1939.
127. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1941.
128. Id. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
129. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
130. Id. at 1953 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 8).
131. Id. ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory
statements do not suffice.").
132. Id. (Citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56).
133. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940.
134. Id. at 1939.
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designating detainees "of high interest" according to their race, religion, or
national origin, 135 the Court found that because the 9/11 attacks were
perpetrated by Arab Muslims, it was not surprising that a legitimate policy
of arresting individuals with suspected connections to the attacks would
136
have a disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims.
Justice Souter, who wrote the majority opinion in Twombly, dissented in
Iqbal.137 His objection stemmed from his rejection of the majority's
determination that there was no supervisory liability in this case and from
his disagreement as to which allegations in the complaint were conclusory.
Justice Souter argued that the actions of the lower officers (allegedly
kicking, punching, and dragging Jqbal) were attributable to Mueller and
Ashcroft. 138 Souter, therefore, argued Iqbal did not have to plead that
Mueller and Ashcroft themselves violated the Constitution. Souter did not
disagree with the majority about the appropriateness of plausibility
pleading; rather, his objection came from his disagreement about the impact
139
of supervisory liability.
Thus far, Iqbal and Twombly are the only two Supreme Court decisions
explaining the standard for plausibility pleading. While the language in
these cases provides some guidance, the exact account of plausibility
pleading that courts will adopt remains unclear.
PART III: ACCOUNT OF PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING
Numerous interpretations of plausibility pleading have been put forth
after Twombly and Iqbal. Some take the position that plausibility pleading
is a return to code pleading's emphasis on the distinction between fact and
law. 140 Others interpret plausibility pleading as a minimal change that will
not make a great difference. 141 This section of the article aims to provide an
account of plausibility pleading that addresses the concerns of discovery

135. Id. at 1951.

136. Id. at 1952 ("All [the complaint] plausibly suggests is that the Nation's top law enforcement
officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected terrorists in the most
secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist activity.").
137. Id. at 1954 (Souter, J., dissenting).
138. Justice Souter found it convincing that Mueller and Ashcroft conceded that a supervisor's
knowledge of a subordinate's unconstitutional conduct are grounds for Bivens liability. lqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1956 (Souter, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 1958.
140. See Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access, 95 IOWA L.
REV. 873, 890-91 (2009).
141. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Twombly, After Two Years: The ProceduralRevolution in Antitrust
That Wasn't, GCP MAGAzINE (July 2009) (on file with author).
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abuses and frivolous litigation, but does not fall victim to the concerns
critics have raised about Iqbal and Twombly.
A. The Test
The first prong of the test determines which allegations in the complaint
deserve the presumption of truth. In Iqbal, the Court stated, "the tenet that
a court must accept a complaint's allegations as true is inapplicable to
threadbare recitals of a cause of action's elements, supported by mere
conclusory statements. ' 142 Conclusory allegations may be written as factual
inferences, but if they simply restate the elements of the cause of action,
they are not presumed to be true. 143 Such allegations are no more than legal
conclusions and are not given the presumption of truth.
The failure to presume conclusory allegations as true is by no means
radical. If such allegations were given the presumption of truth, any
complaint simply restating the elements of the cause of action would be
144
sufficient.
The second prong of the test asks if the complaint as a whole - taking
into account which allegations merit the presumption of truth and which do
not - asserts a plausible cause of action. If a complaint does not assert a
plausible cause of action, making it unlikely that discovery will yield any
information to validate the plaintiff's claim, there is no reason for the
parties to incur the extreme costs of discovery. 145 There are two ways for a
complaint to fail this plausibility prong: first, a claim is implausible if the
non-conclusory facts alleged, assuming they are shown to be true with
146
discovery, would be insufficient to pass a summary judgment motion;
and second, even if the facts could survive a summary judgment motion, the
claim may be implausible if the judge finds that the complaint alleges
147
unreasonable facts.

142. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
143. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 329 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "conclusory" as "expressing a factual
inference without stating the underlying facts on which the inference is based."); see also Edward A.
Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 491-92 (2010) (defining
conclusory as alleging the claim's legal elements).
144. Hartnett, supra note 143, at 488-89 ("[S]o long as there is a motion designed to test the legal
sufficiency of a plaintiff's claim, courts cannot be bound to treat a plaintiff's legal conclusions as true.").
145. Epstein, supra note 141, at 2-3.
146. Id.
147. Id.
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Scholars have observed that plausibility pleading, as set forth in
Twombly and Iqbal, resembles the summary judgment standard. 148 If a goal

of pleading is to minimize unmeritorious actions, then some relationship
between the summary judgment and pleading standards makes sense. A

complaint does not plausibly set forth a cause of action where there is no
reason to believe that its allegations would ever survive summary judgment.
If there is no reason to believe that discovery will bring about the necessary
evidence to survive summary judgment, the defendant should not be
compelled to face the expense and inconvenience of discovery. Allowing
such a complaint to continue would simply be a waste of the court's already
149
limited resources.
The second way a complaint may not be plausible, even if the alleged
facts establish the elements of the cause of action, is when reason and
common sense dictate that the necessary factual inferences are totally
unreasonable. 150 If, despite the factual allegations, the only reasonable
explanation would be that the defendant acted in conformance with the law,
then the complaint should not survive a motion to dismiss. 151
Even though they are not given the presumption of truth, Iqbal does not
necessitate ignoring the legal conclusions altogether at this stage. In fact,
the Court acknowledged that "legal conclusions can provide the complaint's

framework." 152 In determining plausibility, the judge must thus review the
complaint as a whole. 153 The Iqbal Court emphasized that a determination
of plausibility is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense. ' 154 Whether or not a

148. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 92, at 15 (reasoning that the Twombly and Iqbal plausibility
standard "appears equivalent to the standard of decision for summary judgment.").
149. See Epstein, supra note 141, at 3 ("[T]he court concludes that there is no reason to incur the heavy
costs of discovery when there are good theoretical reasons to believe that it will turn up empty."); see
also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558 ("[W]hen the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a
claim of entitlement to relief, this basic deficiency should .. .be exposed at the point of minimum
expenditure of time and money by the parties and the court.") (internal quotations omitted).
150. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 ("[A] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged."); see also Hartnett, supra note 143, at 474 ("[T]he plausibility standard of
Twombly can be understood as equivalent to the traditional insistence that factual inference be
reasonable").
151. It is important to note that this approach toward plausibility pleading does not ask a judge to make
factual determinations. That is, the judge does not determine what actually occurred, rather, given the
complaint as a whole (including the context surrounding the complaint), she determines whether the
complaint tells a reasonable story. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952.
152. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
153. This is the approach the Court used in Twombly. The Court reasoned that 'the complaint
warranted dismissal because it failed in toto to render plaintiffs' entitled to relief plausible." Twombly,
550 U.S. at 569 n.14.
154. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
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complaint sets for a plausible claim for relief will vary depending on the
155
context of the complaint and the different substantive areas of the law.
This second part of the test involves a cost-benefit analysis in which the
judge, accepting the non-conclusory allegations as true, weighs the
likelihood of the plaintiff finding evidence of wrongdoing during discovery
against the costs of proceeding with the claim. If the allegations tell a
reasonable story of wrongdoing, then the cost of proceeding is worthwhile;
conversely, if after accepting the non-conclusory allegations as true, the
most reasonable explanation for the defendant's actions is perfectly legal
behavior, then there is no reason to expect discovery to be fruitful, and the
cost of proceeding to discovery outweighs the distant possibility that the
plaintiff will discover a "smoking gun."
The final part of this article's approach toward plausibility pleading is
not directly discussed in Iqbal and Twombly, but helps assure that
meritorious cases are not lost under this standard. If a plaintiff reasonably
believes she will be unable to meet the plausibility requirements because
she does not have access to necessary information, the court can conduct
early discovery.
There are two points at which time limited early discovery can take
place. One point is after the judge decides the complaint is lacking. The
plaintiff, who truly believes she has a cause of action, can explain to the
judge why the complaint lacks relevant information and how she can obtain
that information. For example, she may assert that the information is
exclusively in the defendant's hands. The judge can then choose to conduct
limited, judicially guided, discovery in areas where the complaint is lacking
and allow the plaintiff to amend her complaint in the event that missing
156
facts are discovered.
The second point at which presuit discovery can take place occurs prior
to filing the complaint. Under this approach, a plaintiff suspecting her
complaint is lacking plausibility may ask the court for limited, pretrial
discovery in order to complete her complaint. 157 Such a request requires the

155. Hartnett, supra note 143, at 496 (Plausibility "will depend on what facts the substantive law makes
material and the appropriate inferential connections between the facts.").
156. This judge-guided discovery would be similar to the system used in many European courts. See
John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Ci. L. REV. 823, 826 (1985)
(describing the German approach to discovery where the court takes responsibility for gathering and
sifting evidence).
157. See Dodson, supra note 78 ("A carefully limited and structure framework of 'pre-discovery
discovery' ... will allow all parties, for a relatively cheap price tag, to determine whether a weak case is
truly meritless and thereby avoid the more expensive price tag of full-fledged litigation."); Kourlis et al.,
supra note 35, at 247 ("[P]re-suit discovery [is] a tool designed to preserve initial court access in fact-
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plaintiff to explain to the judge which facts are missing and why she cannot
obtain them, and then show that the methods by which she plans to conduct
limited discovery will be minimally invasive and cost-effective. If the
judge believes discovery is necessary to validate the complaint, and the
manner by which the plaintiff will conduct discovery is appropriate, then
the judge can approve presuit discovery. Numerous states that require more
158
specific pleading than notice pleading allow for similar discovery.
While the Rules do not specifically discuss the availability of discovery
pending a motion to dismiss, 159 they do not prohibit discovery before the
161
filing of a 12(b)(6) motion. 160 The Rules do permit a stay of discovery,
but stays of discovery are not routine. 162 Therefore, presuit discovery is
possible to achieve without amending the Rules.
This approach is preferable to judge-guided discovery following the
conditional grant of the motion to dismiss, because it deters plaintiffs with
weak claims from filing their cases in the first place. Moreover, once the
judge grants the motion to dismiss under the presuit discovery approach, the
decision is final; whereas under the first model, the plaintiff may
continually attempt to amend the complaint.
One concern that might arise from the use of presuit discovery is that it
simply injects the discovery abuses earlier in the life of the lawsuit.
However, presuit discovery would be issue specific and judicially guided,
thus avoiding those risks posed by an all-encompassing discovery process
after a complaint survives the motion to dismiss. Because the judge will be

based pleading jurisdictions by allowing a putative plaintiff to seek limited discovery before the filing of
a lawsuit if she would otherwise be unable to plead sufficient facts in her complaint.").
158. See PA. R. CIV. P. 4001(c) (giving trial courts discretion to allow the plaintiff to conduct early
discovery where the information the plaintiff seeks is material and necessary to the filing of her
complaint); Berger v. Cuomo, 644 A.2d 333, 337 (Conn. 1994) (allowing ".... an independent action in
equity for discovery ... designed to obtain evidence for use in an action other than the one in which
discovery is sought."); ALA. R. Civ. P. 27 (allowing for pre-action investigative discovery after a
petition in which the plaintiff shows she isunable to bring the cause of action and identifying the key
facts she expects to discover with the proposed discovery); see also Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Access
to Information, Access to Justice: The Role of Presuit Investigatory Discovery, 40 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM, 218 (2007) (examining the widespread use of Texas' broad authority permitting litigants to
pursue presuit discovery).
159. Dodson, supra note 78 (explaining that the drafters probably did not expect the need for such
discovery under their conception of pleading and discovery).
160. Hartnett, supra note 143, at 513 ("[A] district court retains considerable discretion, even after
Twombly and Iqbal, to allow discovery prior to deciding a 12(b)(6) motion.").
161. Under Rule 26, discovery is available unless it is stayed for good cause. Rule 26(c) allows a stay
of discovery pending a motion to dismiss for good cause. FED R. Civ. P. 26.
162. Hartnett, supra note 143, at 507 ("The mere filing of a motion to dismiss does not trigger a stay of
discovery. '[D]iscovery need not cease during the pendency of a motion to dismiss."') (citing SK Hand
Tool Corp. v. Dresser Indus., 852 F. 2d 936, 945 n.ll (7th Cir. 1988)).
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familiar with the confined issues approved for discovery, she can more
closely monitor the process, whereby the judge may end discovery if it
proves too expensive or too invasive. Additionally, considering that presuit
discovery will be confined to the specific issues suspected of presenting an
implausible allegation 63 and the methods of discovery will be directly
approved by the judge, the risks that arise from adversarial, minimally
supervised discovery will not be present.
B. Application to the Cases
Iqbal and Twombly both happened to be cases with especially high bars
to establish plausibility, 164 but not all cases would require such specific
factual allegations to establish plausibility. 165 The complaints in Conley and
Swierkiewicz, two cases critics incorrectly argue were overturned by Iqbal
and Twombly, would allege a plausible cause of action under this approach.
Twombly had a high plausibility bar because it was an antitrust case and
required a showing of an actual agreement of conspiracy. 166 The complaint
in Twombly had two allegations: (1) it alleged agreements by the ILECs to
refrain from competing against one another inferred from ILECs' common
failure "meaningfully [to] pursu[e]" "attractive business opportunit[ies]" in
contiguous markets where they possessed "substantial competitive
advantages; '167 and (2) the complaint alleged that the ILECs "engaged in
parallel conduct" in their respective service areas to inhibit the growth of
the upstart CLECs. 168 The complaint concluded that the common
motivation to thwart the CLECs' competitive efforts led the ILECs to form
169
a conspiracy.
In following step one of plausibility pleading, the Court did not presume
true allegations that the defendants "ha[d] entered into a contract,
combination or conspiracy to prevent competitive entry... and ha[d] agreed

163. In Twombly, for example, the missing issues were the allegation of collusion (as distinct from mere
parallelism). In Iqbal, the missing issues were the allegation of intentional discrimination (as distinct
from mere disparate impact).
164. See Smith v. Duffey, 576 F.3d 336, 339 (7th Cir. 2009) (suggesting Twombly and Iqbal were
special cases because of the impact of qualified immunity in Iqbal and the class action in Twombly).
165. See Hartnett, supra note 143, at 497 (arguing that some cases have a lower bar for plausibility
"because the substantive law ultimately determines what is necessary to prevail, and some things are
more readily inferred than others.").
166. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 92, at 826 (stating that mere allegations of parallel conduct
are not sufficient to show illegal conduct under § 1 of the Sherman Act).
167. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 551.
168. Id. at 550.
169. Id. at 550-51.
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not to compete with one another. '170 Because this language directly
171
mirrored case law setting out the standard for anticompetitive conduct,
the Court reasoned this assertion was a "legal conclusion" and thus not
172
entitled to the assumption of truth.
Once the legal conclusions were not given the presumption of truth, the
Court found the remaining factual allegations established nothing more than
parallel conduct. The Court reasoned that common sense dictated assuming
the existence of a conspiracy from the parallel actions alleged was
unreasonable. Plaintiff's conspiracy theory did not make any economic
sense because the ILECs had reason to resist facilitating competition
without any agreement or conspiracy. 173
Furthermore, an earlier
Department of Justice investigation found no evidence of a conspiracy. 174
It was, therefore, highly unlikely that discovery would reveal evidence of a
conspiracy. Because an assumption of conspiracy was not reasonable from
the allegations in the complaint and because parallel conduct alone was
insufficient to establish a violation of the Sherman Act, 175 there was no
reason to believe that, even with discovery, the case would survive
summary judgment. Therefore, it was not worth the cost of discovery and
use of the justice system's already strained resources.
Another consideration underlying Twombly is the cost of error. The
pressures at hand were beyond those of a typical suit-where a defendant
might be pressured to settle with a single plaintiff. Given the ease with
which antitrust classes are certified, the cost of error in Twombly would be
much worse; the defendants would have unusual settlement pressure
because of the class-wide nature of the proceeding. Moreover, if the Court
allowed a frivolous suit to proceed in this antitrust case, the strategy used
by the Twombly plaintiffs could later be deployed against other heavily
regulated industries.
The high bar for plausibility in Iqbal stemmed from the impact of
qualified immunity in the case. To overcome the qualified immunity
defense, a plaintiff must prove a conscious or reckless disregard for the

170. Id. at 551.

171. See Copperwelt Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 775 (1984) (Section 1 of the
Sherman Act enjoins only anticompetitive conduct "effected by a contract, combination, or conspiracy")
(internal citations omitted).
172. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 564-66.

173. Epstein, supra note 141, at 6 ("It makes perfectly good sense, unilaterally, for each LEC to act
defensively in its own territory").
174. Id.

175. See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 92, at 826.
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law. 176 The Iqbal majority rejected the notion that Mueller and Ashcroft
had supervisory liability over the actions of their subordinates or that a
supervisor must share in the subordinate's unconstitutional purpose. Jqbal's
complaint, therefore, had to provide sufficient specific factual allegations
supporting the position that Ashcroft and Mueller shared in the
unconstitutional purpose.
The complaint alleged, "the [FBI], under the direction of Defendant
Mueller, arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men... as part of
its investigation of the events of September 11"177 and that Mueller and
Ashcroft approved the policy of holding the detainees in restrictive
conditions until they were cleared. 178 The complaint named Ashcroft as the
"principal architect" of the policy and identified Mueller as "instrumental in
[its] adoption, promulgation, and implementation. 1 79 Iqbal contended that
Mueller and Ashcroft "'each knew of, condoned, and willfully and
maliciously agreed to subject' [Iqbal] to harsh conditions of confinement
'as a matter of policy, solely on account of [his] religion, race, and/or
180
national origin and for no legitimate penological interest.'
The Court first explained which allegations were legal conclusions that
did not merit the presumption of truth. 181 First, the Court reasoned that
allegations that Ashcroft was the "principal architect" and that Mueller was
"instrumental" in adopting and executing the policy of confining people
"solely on account of [their] religion, race, and/or national origin" was
182
simply a recitation of the elements of the cause of action.
The Court treated as non-conclusory the allegations that after September
1lth, the FBI arrested and detained thousands of Arab Muslim men as part
of their investigations under Mueller's direction. The Court also did not
consider the allegations that Mueller and Ashcroft approved the policy of
holding post-September 11 detainees in highly restrictive conditions of
confinement for clearing by the FBI conclusory. 183 These allegations did

not merely track the language in the complaint and thus merited the
presumption of truth.

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

See Hall v. Lombardi, 996 F.2d 954, 961 (8th Cir. 1993).
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1944 (2009).
Id. at 1941.
Id. at 1944.
Id.
Id. at 1951.
Id.
Id.
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The Court reasoned that allegations entitled to the presumption of truth
were consistent with a discriminatory policy; however, considering the
context of the actions, it was unreasonable to assume simply from the
disparate impact on Arab Muslims that Mueller and Ashcroft implemented
the policy with a discriminatory purpose. From the allegations in the
complaint, Arab Muslims were the primary subjects of the detention. The
Court reasoned there was no reason to think a discriminatory policy was
any more likely than the nondiscriminatory reaction one might expect
following the September llth attacks. 184 Given that Arab Muslim men
perpetrated the acts, it was unsurprising that mostly Arab Muslim men were
confined due to suspected participation in the events.
The Court emphasized its "rejection of the careful-case-management
approach is especially important in suits where government-official
defendants are entitled to assert the defense of qualified immunity." 185 The
Court was concerned about the costs of litigation to officials and especially
the intrusiveness of discovery where officials must expend valuable time
and resources that might otherwise be directed to the proper execution of
government work. The Court explained that these concerns are even more
extreme when the government officials are responding to "a national and
international security emergency unprecedented in the history of the
American Republic. ' 186 Although the potential return from proceeding to
discovery may have been higher than in Twombly, 187 given the more
reasonable explanation for the allegations that Arab Muslims were the
primary detainees and the concerns underlying qualified immunity, the risks
of continuing the case - subjecting Mueller and Ashcroft to invasive
discovery - outweighed the harms of dismissing the case. The qualified
immunity analysis, therefore, holds a great deal of significance in the
1 88
Court's holding in Iqbal.

184. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952 ("All [the complaint] plausibly suggests is that the Nation's top law
enforcement officers, in the aftermath of a devastating terrorist attack, sought to keep suspected
terrorists in the most secure conditions available until the suspects could be cleared of terrorist
activity.").
185. Id. at 1953.
186. Id. at 1945.
187. Iqbal may have found some document or evidence from a deposition that Mueller and Ashcroft
had discriminatory intent, whereas, given the economic incentives and the past Department of Justice
investigation, it was unlikely that discovery in Twombly would yield evidence of a conspiracy.
188. Hartnett, supra note 143, at 497.
[I]t is easier to infer that a supervisor knew about a subordinate's constitutional violation but
did nothing about it (perhaps because he thought other matters of higher priority and the
costs of discipline to exceed the benefit) than to infer that a supervisor shared the
subordinate's unconstitutional purpose. For this reason, the Iqbal Court's insistence that
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In retiring the Conley "no set of facts" standard, the Court was careful to
not overrule the holding in Conley. This makes sense because the Conley
189
complaint states a plausible cause of action. In Conley v. Gibson,
African-American union members sued their union leaders under the
Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. Under this law and previous
Supreme Court precedent, 190 the union had an obligation not to
discriminate. The Conley complaint charged the white union leadership
with removing black employees from favorable jobs and thus giving the
jobs to white union members. 191
This case was different from Twombly and Iqbal because the potential
returns for discovery in this case were large. The defendants in Conley had
every incentive to hide their discriminatory purpose. Unlike Twombly
where the more reasonable explanation was mere parallel action, or Iqbal
where the more reasonable explanation for Mueller and Ashcroft's policy
was national security, the reasonable explanation for the alleged action in
Conley was discrimination. Given the allegations in the complaint and the
context of the suit (a time when discrimination was prevalent in the United
States), the most reasonable explanation for the white union representatives
replacing black employees with white employees was a discriminatory
purpose. Because the complaint in Conley stated a plausible cause of
action, the complaint would survive a motion to dismiss even under the
plausibility standard: Iqbal and Twombly, therefore, did not overrule
Conley.
Critics often cite Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. 192 as a case in conflict
with Twombly and Iqbal. 93 However, the Swierkiewicz complaint would
survive under plausibility pleading. Swierkiewicz was an employment
discrimination action in which the plaintiff alleged he was terminated on
account of his national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. The plaintiff, a 53-year-old Hungarian native, alleged that
after working for the defendant for six years, he was demoted and his
position was transferred to a less experienced, younger employee who, like

'supervisory liability' is a 'misnomer' in the context of a Bivens action and that 'purpose
rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability' is a crucial step in concluding
that the Iqbal complaint was insufficient.
Id.
189. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
190. Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., 323 U.S. 192, 207 (1944).
191. Conley, 355 U.S. at 42-43.
192. 534 U.S. 506, 514 (2002).
193. See Scott Dodson, PleadingStandards After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 93 VA. L. REV. IN
BRIEF 135, 141-42 (2007).
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the president of the defendant corporation, was of French origin. 194 The

plaintiff's complaint alleged that after attempting to discuss his concerns
with his employer, he was fired. Unlike the allegations in Twombly and
Iqbal, the allegations in Swierkiewicz did not simply track the cause of
action and consequently, would be entitled to the presumption of truth.
Moreover, given the allegations, there was no reason to think there was
some other, more reasonable explanation for the actions. If the plaintiff was
more qualified and had more experience than the French national with
whom he was replaced, the reasonable conclusion for the president's
actions was a discriminatory purpose.
This analysis of Conley and Swierkiewicz shows most complaints will
not face as high a bar for plausibility as needed to survive the motion to
dismiss in Iqbal and Twombly.
C. Benefits of Plausibility Pleading
Contrary to the views of some strident critics, plausibility pleading may
not be far off from the reformers' vision of the 1938 Rules. Perhaps the
most important feature the reformers hoped to bring about in the Rules was
a focus on the merits of the case. Notice pleading may have initially been
consistent with that vision back when discovery was simple and trial not
prohibitively expensive. The realities of the discovery process today,
however, have taken litigation far from the initial goals of the 1938
reformers. 195 For example, the 1938 reformers envisioned a legal system
where most suits culminated in a trial on the merits, but today, most cases
1 96
result in settlement.
Consistent with the 1938 reformers' intentions, plausibility pleading
helps return the focus of suits from cost to merit. The Rules were designed,
"to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action. ' 197 From the beginning, the Rules recognized that allowing
194. Swierkiewicz, 506 U.S. at 508.
195. Schwarzer, supra note 58, at 703 (arguing that the vision of the reformers is largely unfulfilled
because "[t]he staggering increase in the volume and complexity of cases has thrust case management
on judges and has involved them deeply in controlling the scope and pace of litigation.").
196. See Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of Litigation, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442, 442 (Peter Newman ed. 1998) (explaining that over
90% of filed lawsuits in America settle); Stephen C. Yeazell, Transparency for Civil Settlements:
NASDAQfor Lawsuits? (UCLA-RAND Ctr. for Law & Pub. Policy, forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at
5- 6), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1161343 (explaining that of about 17 million civil claims
filed annually, about 60% will settle- totaling about S50 billion); see also Resnik, supra note 30, at 597
(explaining that the initial version the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure did not use the word
"settlement" in the entire text, but today, the word appears four times).
197. Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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unmeritorious suits to proceed to trial was undesirable. 198 The reason the
reformers advocated for broad discovery was to preserve the merits of the
suit and allow the parties the opportunity to gather maximal evidence that
will ultimately raise the chances of reaching a just result. Today, however,
discovery frustrates the very purpose it was meant to further by dominating
litigation and imposing burdens on parties disproportionate to its benefits.
199
Under code pleading, too many plaintiffs suffered from facing
dismissals of meritorious suits. Today, by overprotecting meritorious cases,
defendants are too often harmed by frivolous litigation.200 To restore focus
on the merits important to the 1938 reformers, we may have to deviate from
the reformers' specific ideas of discovery. The plausibility dismissal
standard provides a procedural means by which judges can dispose of cases
20 1
on their merits more efficiently than the current system allows.
Plausibility pleading returns the focus from the cost of litigation to the merit
of the suit and thus better reflects the reformers' values.
The major reason why closer case management is often unsuccessful in
limiting the cost of discovery is because the judge often has insufficient
20 2
information about the case to determine what discovery is necessary.

198. See CHARLES E. CLARK, PROCEDURE THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS OF CHARLES E. CLARK
85, 146 (Charles Alan Wright & Harry M. Reasoner eds., 1965) ("A court has failed in granting justice
when it forces a party to an expensive trial of several weeks' duration to meet purely formal allegations
without substance fully as much as when it improperly refuses to hear a case at all.").
199. See Epstein, supra note 9, at 98.
The current provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were designed in an earlier
era for litigation that on average has been far simpler than litigation today. The Rules
operated on an assumption that the greater risks in civil litigation came from the premature
dismissal of meritorious cases brought by ordinary people of little means or sophistication.
Now there is a far greater peril of allowing frivolous litigation to go on too long as well as a
risk of cutting short meritorious litigation.
Id.; Schwarzer, supra note 58, at 703 ("Often [discovery] is conducted so aggressively and abusively
that it frustrates the objectives of the Federal Rules"); Kourlis et al., supra note 35, at 253 ("[T]he
discovery process may prevent parties from even getting to the facts that lie at the heart of their
dispute.").
200. See Schwarzer, supra note 58.
201. See Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 550 ("In a procedural world attuned to resolutions other than trial,
the identification of sticking points and of each party's needs and concerns, and the tailored
development of information to address these matters, would take center stage. Pleadings might need to
be fuller, and discovery narrower in its early stages.").
202. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 560 n.6 (finding that judges "cannot define 'abusive' discovery except in
theory, because in practice [they] lack essential information."); Easterbrook, supra note 63, at 638 ("A
magistrate supervising discovery does not- cannot-know the expected productivity of a given request,
because the nature of the requester's claim and the contents of the files (or head) of the adverse party are
unknown"); Kourlis et al., supra note 35, at 279 ("Under a notice pleading regime, it is more difficult to
ascertain whether a disproportionate discovery request was motivated by an innocent effort to collect all
relevant facts or a more sinister desire to drive up the cost of responding and force a settlement.").
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Requiring a plaintiff to allege more facts in a complaint narrows the issues
in dispute and gives the judge more information about the case that will
20 3
help facilitate stricter judicial control over discovery.
Plausibility pleading also preserves judicial resources. Instead of
wasting resources on conducting discovery, summary judgment, or other
motions that may arise before a sure-loser is dismissed, plausibility
pleading allows for the screening of unmeritorious claims before the
expense of discovery. This saves both the innocent defendants' and the
courts' resources. Furthermore, by weeding out the wholly unmeritorious
suits, plausibility pleading allows judicial resources to focus on meritorious
cases.

204

Another benefit of plausibility pleading is that it may restore some
control to appellate judges. In a world where most cases end in settlement,
there is little opportunity for appellate judges to review cases. Authority
has thus moved from the hands of appellate and trial judges to the
litigants. 20 5 Because granting a motion to dismiss is a final judgment,
parties can appeal a successful 12(b)(6) motion. A pleading standard that
imposes stricter requirements of complaints will most likely result in a
greater number of successful motions to dismiss. This approach, in turn,
will give appellate judges the opportunity to review dismissed cases that,
under the previous system, would likely have resulted in settlement and
never afforded judicial review on appeal.
Requiring complaints to contain more facts also provides better notice to
the defendants as to which claim they may have to defend against. While
skeletal pleadings give notice to the defendant as to the existence of the
suit, they may not provide sufficient detail to allow the defendant to prepare
an appropriate response or defense strategy. Without more details in the
complaint, the defendant has no way of knowing what is important in the
20 6
suit and what is not.
Disposing of unmeritorious claims early in the litigation process also
better regulates behavior in society. Litigation serves more of a regulatory

203. See Kourlis et al., supra note 35, at 279. ("A requirement to plead facts from the outset would
remove many of the 'innocent' excuses associated with excessive discovery, and would make truly
malicious efforts to overuse discovery easier to spot and sanction.").
204. See id. at 262 ("[A]llowing issues to be narrowed earlier in the litigation would streamline the
litigation process, reduce cost, and thereby allow a greaternumber of meritorious claims to be filed.").
205. See Yeazell, supra note 30 (arguing that because of the decreasing access to trials control has
shifted out of the hands of appellate judges and into the hands of litigants).
206. See Kourlis et al., supra note 35, at 246 (arguing for stricter pleading requirements at the onset of
cases).
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role in the United States than in any other country. 2 7 Therefore, it is
important that the regulation efficiently compensates plaintiffs who have
been harmed and deters defendants who have engaged in undesirable
behavior, while not deterring defendants who behaved properly. This can
be done by dismissing unmeritorious suits at their onset and thus investing
judicial resources in the meritorious suits.
The problem with a reality in which most cases end in settlement is that,
without proper regulation of settlements, the litigation system may fail to
perform its functions of compensating victims and deterring law-breakers.
When a defendant settles at a value that still makes the bad behavior
worthwhile, the settlement will not deter the defendant from engaging in the
undesirable behavior; furthermore, it may not sufficiently compensate the
plaintiff for her loss. On the other hand, settlements of unmeritorious cases
or that are too high may discourage socially beneficial activities. 2 8 Low
merit lawsuits will target those who complied with the law just as much as,
if not more than, injurers who did not comply with the law. Therefore, lawabiding defendants will be discouraged from engaging in certain unharmful,
and even potentially beneficial, behaviors altogether if they fear that such
20 9
actions may result in litigation.
Low merit suits will also fail to provide a strong incentive for tortfeasors
to comply with the law, because their likelihood of facing litigation does
not follow from their compliance; low merit suits thus lead to underdeterrence of undesirable behavior. 210 Early dismissals that accurately

207. See Judith Resnik, Lessons in Federalismfrom the 1960s Class Action Rule and the 2005 Class
Action FairnessAct: "The PoliticalSafeguards" of Aggregate TranslocalActions, 156 U. PA. L. REV.
1929, 1938 (2008)
The 1960s rulemaking was part of a larger story aimed at using the federal courts for
regulatory enforcement of federal rights. The relevant players included the Supreme Court,
Congress, and the rule drafters, all of whom were interested in facilitating access to federal
courts for litigants to enforce newly articulated national rights.
Id.
208. Hay & Spier, supra note 197, at 447.
209. Keith N. Hylton, When Should a Case Be Dismissed? The Economics of Pleadingand Summary
Judgment Standards, 16 S. CT. ECON. REV. 39, 46-47 (2008).
Faced with the risk of being held liable whether or not he complies with the law, a potential
defendant may choose to avoid the activity that might give rise to liability. This is an
example of a type of over-deterrence. To the extent such litigation-induced decisions
deprive society of the benefits of productive activity, low merit litigation is costly to society.
Id.
210. Id. at 45.
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dismiss unmeritorious suits and maintain the meritorious suits have the
potential to increase the average merit of lawsuits, thus enhancing
211
incentives to comply with the law.
Aside from dismissing unmeritorious suits, plausibility pleading will
help limit the number of unmeritorious suits brought in the first place. One
reason why it is worthwhile for plaintiffs to bring claims of lower value is
because the upfront costs are very low. If the plaintiff can file her suit at a
cheaper cost than the defendant faces in defending the suit, there would be a
settlement zone even if the case is obviously unmeritorious. 212 If the
upfront costs to the plaintiff increased, there would be less cases where the
cost of filing the suit is significantly lower cost than that of defending the
213
suit.
In his article, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become
(Disguised) Summary Judgment, Richard Epstein observed that "the 1938
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not well situated to the complexities of
modem litigation. '214 To account for the changes in the litigation landscape
since the time of the reformers, we may need to deviate from the earlier
understandings of pleading to return to the underlying principles of the
Rules. A pleading standard that weeds out unmeritorious suits from the
onset helps return the focus of litigation to the merits of a suit instead of the
costs of discovery.
PART IV: CRITIQUES OF PLAUSIBILITY PLEADING
After Twombly and Iqbal, numerous critiques arose opposing plausibility
pleading. This section describes and responds to some of the major
critiques to plausibility pleading.
A. Plausibility Pleading is Contrary to the Federal Rules
One critique of plausibility pleading is that the standard the Supreme
Court adopted in Iqbal and Twombly is contrary to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. These critics argue that the founders of the Rules did not

211. Id. at 41.

212. Kozel & Rosenberg, supra note 2, at 1856.
213. It seems that Iqbal is already increasing upfront costs to plaintiffs and is, therefore, probably
deterring frivolous suits. See Alleging Damage to Plaintiffs' Cases, Critics Seek to Overturn Iqbal
Ruling, 78 U.S.L.W. 2304, at 2306 (Nov. 24, 2009) [hereinafter Alleging Damage] (explaining that

many members of the plaintiffs' bar are spending more time and resources putting more factual
information into their complaints to survive an Iqbal motion to dismiss).
214. Epstein, supra note 9, at 66.
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envision a pleading's function as narrowing issues in a case 215 and
216
plausibility pleading is thus contrary to the intent of the founders.
A sponsor of the critique that plausibility pleading is contrary to the
21 7
Rules is A. Benjamin Spencer in his article Plausibility Pleading.
Spencer argues the plausibility standard is inconsistent with the liberal
pleading created by the Rules, 218 and
[r]equiring factual allegations that make a 'showing... of entitlement
to relief' runs counter to the understanding of the original drafters of
the rules that in order to state a claim of liability, conclusory legal
allegations coupled with skeletal, contextual facts would suffice and
219
detailed fact pleading would no longer be required.
Ever since Conley, it was long understood-both by the Supreme Court and
by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee-that the Rules set out a liberal
standard for pleading. 220 According to Spencer, Twombly and Iqbal
improperly changed this standard. Under the Rules, the pleading phase is
221
not the appropriate point to screen cases for merit.
Spencer also argues that plausibility pleading conflicts with other federal
rules that are linked to Rule 8(a). 222 According to Spencer, plausibility
pleading is incompatible with Rule 11. Under Rule 11, attorneys certify
that the claims presented in a complaint are warranted by the law and that
215. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 92, at 835 ("The motivating theory [behind the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure] was that the stages subsequent to pleading-disclosure, discovery, pretrial conferences,
summary judgment and trial-could more efficiently and fairly handle functions such as narrowing
issues and revealing facts, and thus the whole system could better deliver a proper decision on the
merits.").
216. Id. at 838 ("The design principles of the Rules did not contemplate probing the allegations at the
pleading stage.").
217. Spencer, supra note 90.
218. Id. at 461 ("The Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 8(a) (2) in Twombly rankles because it is
inconsistent with the liberal pleading regime established by the Federal Rules and previously embraced
by the Court itself.").
219. Id. at 442.
220. See Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 ARiZ. L. REv. 987, 988 (2003) ("If
any rule in federal civil procedure deserves the label 'blackletter,' it is notice pleading."); see also
Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957).
221. See Spencer, supra note 90, at 484.
[I]dentifying claims suspected of having shaky or insufficient factual support is not the
proper role of pleadings in our system. Rather, the Federal Rules assign the function of
screening out unsupported claims to later stages in the litigation. Specifically, the Court has
isolated the summary judgment device found in Rule 56 as the appropriate mechanism for
such screening.
Id.
222. Id. at 460 ("[T]he Twombly opinion can be faulted for propounding an untenable interpretation of
Rule 8(a) that is wholly inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and at odds with other rules of
pleading and procedure applicable in the federal courts.").
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the allegations "have evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are
likely to have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunityforfurther
investigation or discovery.'' 223 Spencer explains this allowance is directly
linked to the liberal pleading standard. By moving from notice pleading to
plausibility pleading, Spencer argues "the Court seems to be precluding the
22 4
very types of complaints contemplated and permitted by Rule 11(b).
Spencer also argues that plausibility pleading is inconsistent with a Rule
12(e) motion for a more definite statement. Under Rule 12(e), a party can
move for a more definite statement of a pleading when the pleading is so
vague that the opposing party cannot prepare a response. 225 Spencer argues
that a necessary implication of this Rule is that a complaint lacking
sufficient detail does not fail to state a claim, but states a claim without
226
offering the defendant enough information to respond.
Spencer argues that Rule 9(b) also provides evidence that plausibility
pleading is inconsistent with the Federal Rules. Rule 9(b) requires a party
alleging fraud or mistake to "state with particularity the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake. '227 It then states that "[m]alice, intent,
knowledge, and other conditions of a person's mind may be alleged
generally. '228 Spencer argues that if allegations of fraud or mistake require
more of pleading than typical claims, and plausibility pleading requires
"particularity," it implies that complaints not alleging fraud or mistake need
not be alleged with the same particularity. 229 If Rule 8(a)(2) set the
pleading standard as high as Rule 9(b), then Rule 9(b) would be
superfluous. Habeas Rule 2(c) requires a petition "state the facts supporting
each ground" for relief.230 Spencer argues this suggests that Rule 8(a)'s
231
requirements are less demanding than Habeas Rule 2(c).
Spencer finally argues that plausibility pleading is contrary to the Federal
Rules because the sample forms in the Federal Rules endorse the use of
232
conclusory allegations that would not suffice under plausibility pleading.
Form 11, for example, states "[o]n [date], at [place], the defendant
negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff. As a result, the

223. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (emphasis added).
224. Spencer, supra note 90, at 477.
225. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(e).

226. Spencer, supra note 90, at 477.
227. FED. R. CIv. P. 9(b).
228. Id.

229. Spencer, supra note 90, at 473.
230. Id. at 477.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 442; see also Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 92, at 836 (arguing that the sample forms in
the Federal Rules allow plaintiffs to plead with conclusory allegations).
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plaintiff was physically injured, lost wages or income, suffered physical and
mental pain and incurred medical expenses of $[amount]. '"233 A complaint
with these allegations would not form an adequate claim under plausibility
pleading.
It is undeniable that plausibility pleading is a departure from Conley's
articulation of notice pleading. However, Conley's "no set of facts"
standard is not necessitated by Rule 8's requirement of "a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." A
reinterpretation of this language is, therefore, not necessarily a departure
from the rule. In fact, we have been moving in the direction of pleadings
stricter than pure "notice" pleadings for a while. The Conley standard itself
required more than mere notice of a suit's existence. In Conley, the
Supreme Court stressed that the Rules require the complaint to give the
defendant "fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests. '234 Moreover, amendments to the Rules and court decisions
over the years have made it clear that the pleading standard requires more
235
of parties than just notifying one's opponent of the existence of the suit.
Even when applying the Conley standard, courts often required a complaint
do more than just give notice. 236 Furthermore, there have been more
demanding pleading requirements in certain kinds of claims. For example,
Rule 9(b) requires that "a party must state with particularity the
'237
circumstances constituting fraud or mistake.
Spencer is wrong in his account of Rule 8 as it compares to the other
Rules. Stricter pleading may set the bar slightly higher for Rule 11 in that
the bar for frivolousness may have been lowered; that is, if a lawyer knows
he does not have sufficient information to file a plausible complaint, it may
be deemed frivolous. This result, however, is not contrary to the language
of Rule 11. Plausibility pleading is not contrary to Rule 12(e) because even
a complaint that meets the plausibility standard may not give the defendant

233. FED. R. ClV. P. Form 11.
234. Conley, 355 U.S. at 47.
235. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, for example, requires attorneys or parties to certify there is a
good faith basis for allegations made in pleadings, which has contributed to more detailed pleadings.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b); see also Ward, supra note 34, at 900 ("[V]arious Federal Rules amendments,
court decisions, and legislative initiatives have sent subtle and not so-subtle signals to parties that more
detailed pleadings might be required.").
236. Ward supra note 34, at 900 ("Courts 'talk' of notice pleading, but often require more[.]"); see also
Richard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 433 (1986) (noting a trend toward stricter pleading in reported federal cases).
237. FED. R. Civ. P. 9 (b). Rule 9 lists other allegations that require special pleadings such as special
damages (9(g)), challenges to a party's capacity in (9(a)), and performance of occurrence of a condition
precedent in (9(c)).
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sufficient detail to respond. Even if the story the complaint tells is
reasonable, it may fail to mention key facts the defendant may need to
formulate her response.
Spencer is probably correct in assuming some of the sample forms may
no longer suffice under plausibility pleading. Simply stating that the
defendant "negligently drove a motor vehicle against the plaintiff' merely
tracks the language of the cause of action. Plausibility pleading would
probably require the plaintiff to plead how the defendant was negligent (for
example, allege the defendant was not looking at the road or was talking on
her cell phone). However, simply because some of the forms may no
longer be good samples does not necessarily show that plausibility pleading
is contrary to the Rules. 238 Changing the sample forms may be a necessary
consequence of reforming the pleading standard to better reflect today's
litigation landscape.
Not only is plausibility pleading consistent with the intent of the
founders, it restores their ultimate goal of deciding cases on their merits. It
is clear that the founders wanted some specificity in complaints. 239 It is
equally clear the founders did not believe a complaint that simply stated
240
legal conclusions stated a proper cause of action.
Even if a critic were to successfully show that an aspect of plausibility
pleading is contrary to the original intention of the reformers with regard to
a particular Rule, it may be an acceptable cost. The reformers' vision of
pleadings was informed by their understanding of the legal system at the
time. Even if their vision of pleadings was to set a low bar so that most
cases proceed to discovery, it was on the understanding that cases would go
to trial and be decided on their merits. Had they known how today's system
functions (in which the threat of discovery itself often makes defendants
pay without any consideration of the merits) they may have reconsidered
lenient pleadings. Habeas Rule 2(c), for example, was written with notice

238. See Hartnett, supra note 143, at 496 n.108 ("[C]ompliance with the forms .. does not guarantee
that the complaint will survive a 12(b)(6) motion because deciding such a motion depends on the
substantive law. Imagine that a state were to abolish the tort of negligence regarding automobile
accidents (including with pedestrians) and substitute a compensation scheme. Under this substantive
law, a complaint that tracked Form 11 would nevertheless be properly dismissed.").
239. See generally Dodson, supra note 78 and accompanying text.
240. Charles E. Clark, Special Pleadingin the "Big Case," 21 F.R.D. 45 (1957);

No rule of thumb is possible, but in general it may be said that the pleader should not
content himself with alleging merely the final and ultimate conclusion which the court is to
make in deciding the case for him. He should go at least one step further back and allege
the circumstances from which this conclusion directly followed.
Charles E. Clark, The Complaint in Code Pleading, 35 Yale L.J. 259, 266 (1926) [hereinafter The
Complaint].
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pleading in mind. Had plausibility pleading been the standard from the
beginning, there may be no need for the stricter pleading requirements of
Habeas Rule 2(c).
Spencer, along with other critics, argues it is the role of summary
judgment, not pleading dismissals, to screen unmeritorious suits. 241
However, given the expense of discovery, screening at the summary
judgment phase is too late. By then, most cases have either faced the
extreme cost of discovery (thus clearly obtaining neither a "just" nor
"speedy" resolution of the case) or the parties have settled, even though the
case may not have merit. 242 It is interesting to note that critics of the
summary judgment trilogy made the similar argument that the Court
243
rewrote Rule 56 without an official change to the Rules.
Another critique, specific to Iqbal, comes from Robert Bone. Bone
argues that, unlike Twombly, Iqbal uses a two-pronged approach toward
pleading that filters legal conclusions before applying the plausibility
standard to factual allegations. 244 According to Bone, this approach is a
return to code pleading's emphasis on the distinction between factual and
legal allegations, which the 1938 reformers sought to eliminate. Given this
history, such fact pleading is directly contrary to the goals of the Rules and
thus inconsistent with Rule 8. 245 Bone explains the focus on the distinction
between factual and legal allegations is problematic due to the difficulty in
attempting to distinguish the two. Under Bone's account of the Iqbal
standard, the court must look at each allegation individually to filter out the
246
legal conclusions.

241. Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168-69
(1993) ("In the absence of such an amendment [of Rule 9(b)], federal courts and litigants must rely on
summary judgment and control of discovery to weed out unmeritorious claims sooner rather than
later.").
242. Kourlis et al., supra note 35, at 255 ("[S]ummary judgment is not a particularly efficient or costeffective way to separate the strong claims from the weak.").
243. See Stempel, supra note 16, at 157 (arguing that in the summary judgment trilogy "the Court
effectively rewrote rule 56 to create a summary judgment doctrine that went beyond what even the
reformers had urged.").
244. Bone, supra note 140, at 877.
245. Id. at 890; see also Allen Ides, Bell Atlantic and the Principle of Substantive Sufficiency Under
FederalRule of Civil Procedure8(a)(2): Toward a Structured Approach to FederalPleadingPractice,
243 F.R.D. 604, 633 (2007) (arguing that Twombly's standard could be read as "return[ing] pleading to a
pre-FRCP regime in which courts were required to distinguish among many facts and conclusions of
law, and in which conclusory allegations were suspect and often inadequate as a matter of law.").
245. Spencer, supra note 90, at 431-33.
246. Bone, supra note 140, at 877.
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Bone's understanding of Iqbal, however, may not be accurate.
Throughout Iqbal, the Court specifically states it is applying Twombly's
standard. Iqbal can be read as doing just so. It is hard to understand
exactly how the Iqbal Court applies Twombly because a large degree of its
analysis encompasses qualified immunity.2 47 Once the Court established
that Jqbal cannot attribute discriminatory motives from lower to senior
ranking officials, it held that the complaint must include specific allegations
as to those higher officials. As a matter of the qualified immunity doctrine,
therefore, the Court's understanding made it hard to sue the higher officials
for discrimination. Taking this aspect of the case into account, one can
easily read Iqbal to apply Twombly' s version of plausibility pleading.
The Twombly Court found Twombly's complaint deficient because the
actions alleged were precisely the legal actions one would expect in a
competitive telecommunications market; therefore, the more reasonable
explanation that follows from the allegations in the complaint is that the
defendants behaved lawfully. Similarly, even given the allegations in
Jqbal's complaint - disregarding the language quoting the elements of the
cause of action - the actions that Mueller and Ashcroft took were exactly
what one would expect from the government when reacting to the events of
September 11 th attacks in a non-discriminatory manner. That is, one would
expect there to be a disparate impact on Arab Muslims because the
perpetrators of the September 11 attacks were Arab Muslims. Iqbal's
complaint, therefore, did not raise a reasonable expectation that Ashcroft or
Mueller acted with a discriminatory purpose (as opposed to acting in spite
of a disparate impact). It is thus possible to take the Court at its word as
following Twombly and not setting forth a new test focused on fact pleading
248
versus legal allegations.
Moreover, the Court's refusal to presume legal conclusions as true is
neither new nor a return to code pleading. Code pleading required facts to
be laid out in a great amount of detail2 9 Only the ultimate material
objective facts that made up the cause of action were to be alleged, while

247. See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
248. If Bone is correct that Iqbal's version of plausibility pleading requires a distinction between factual
and legal conclusions, then perhaps the standard is indeed inconsistent with the goals of the 1938
reformers, and Twombly's standard should apply instead. The plausibility pleading standard this article
endorses is not one that requires strict distinctions between factual and legal allegations; rather, it only
necessitates the court not presume pure legal conclusions as true.
249. STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE, 333-44 (7th ed. 2008) (describing the code pleading
regime and its demand for great detail).
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250
conclusions of law and evidential facts were not supposed to be pleaded.
Refusing to presume legal conclusions that track the elements of a cause of
251
action as true is by no means a return to this standard.

The founders' desire to distance their approach from code pleading does
252 Just
not necessitate a rejection of all distinctions between law and fact.
as the founders did not consider reiterating the elements of a claim to
establish a cause of action, so too does plausibility pleading require a
plaintiff to allege more than just the elements of a cause of action without
2 53
any factual substance.
The founders may have intentionally left Rule 8 ambiguous.2 54 Although
the founders wished to break away from code pleading, it is uncertain that
they intended to bury the distinction between law and fact entirely.
B. The Court is Not the Right Entity to Change the Pleading Standard
Another popular objection to Twombly and Iqbal is that the Supreme
255
Court is not the right entity to implement a reinterpretation of the Rules.
Proponents of this critique argue that the Supreme Court is not the right
entity to change the pleading standard and that an amendment to the Rules
is necessary to change the pleading standards from notice to plausibility
pleading.2 56 According to supporters of this argument, Conley had been the
long accepted standard and a change to such an accustomed standard should
2 57
come from the rulemaking process, not unilaterally from the Court.

250. The Complaint,supra note 241, at 259-60.
251. Identifying an allegation as conclusory is easy because one can look to the language of the cause of
action to determine if the allegation in the complaint essentially copies or tracks that language. No
analysis of the distinction between law and fact is necessary in identifying an allegation as conclusory.
252. See Hartnett, supra note 143, at 487 ("[T]he Federal Rules' rejection of the code's insistence that
conclusions of law not be plead does not entail a wholesale rejection of the distinction between
allegations of fact and legal conclusions[.]").
253. If legal conclusions were given the presumption of truth, any complaint could just quote from the
standard and pass the motion to dismiss, rendering the motion to dismiss phase essentially meaningless,
because even a complaint that does not give notice as to what the complaint is about can merely track
the elements of the cause of action.
254. See Herrmann et al., supra note 77, at 142. But see Epstein, supra note 141, at 15 ("There is little
doubt that the original conception behind the 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure strongly favored the
adoption of notice pleading- a reaction to the somewhat technical pleading requirements that existed
under the earlier system of Code Pleading[.]").
255. See Bone, supra note 87, at 850 (arguing that the Supreme Court is not institutionally wellequipped to decide whether strict pleading is desirable; a change to pleading should come through
rulemaking process, or, through Congress).
256. See Spencer, supra note 90, at 494 ("Amending the rules had been the means used to address such
concerns and it is unclear why the Supreme Court acted outside of the amendment process to effect this
most recent change.").
257. The Court, as recently as 2002, continued to endorse the Conley standard; see Swierkiewicz, 534
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These critics argue that the amendment process for the Rules is more
democratic, transparent, and accountable than the decision of nine
2
justices. 58
The formal amendment process requires the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee to notify the legal community of the proposed changes and
provide an opportunity for the community to comment on the proposed
changes. 259 It also requires a great deal of research before implementing a
change to the Rules. 260 Insofar as the Court rested its new standard on the
premises that the costs of discovery are too high and cannot be solved by
judicial regulation, these premises should be tested. While a committee
dedicated to changing the rules will engage in this research, the Court does
not have the capacity to elicit such information.
Some critics have gone so far as to label Iqbal and Twombly judicial
activism. 261 It is interesting to note, however, that this same criticism arose
when the Court passed the summary judgment trilogy. 262 Jeffrey Stempel
argued that the "nine justices of the Supreme Court, quite removed from
daily trial court activities, ordinary litigation, and the public in general, are
an especially ill-equipped group to conduct alone the cost-benefit analysis
that should have preceded any substantial change in summary judgment
'263
jurisprudence.
A large coalition of civil rights groups, trial lawyers, and public interest
advocates is encouraging the passage of legislation to overturn Twombly
and Iqbal.264 In July of 2009, Senator Arlen Specter introduced the Notice
Pleading Restoration Act that aimed to bar federal courts from dismissing
any case except under the standards established by the Supreme Court in
Conley.265 Another piece of legislation aiming to reverse Twombly and

U.S. at 512 (2002) (holding that Rule 8(a)(2) requires a complaint simply give the defendant "fair notice
of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests") (quoting Conley, 355 U.S. at 47).
258. Spencer, supra note 90, at 454; see also Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 92, at 847 ("[T]his
process guarantees that notice, comment, and a good deal of consultation among bench and bar will
precede significant (and even insignificant) procedural change.").
259. Stempel, supra, note 16 at 182.
260. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 92, at 848 (arguing more research should have been done before
changing the pleading standard).
261. Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-N.Y.) called the Iqbal and Twombly decisions "judicial activism at its
worst." Alleging Damage, supra note 214, at 2305.
262. See Stempel, supra note 16, at 185-86 (arguing that the changes to summary judgment should
have been made by a change to Rule 56 under the Rules Enabling Act).
263. Id. at 191.
264. Alleging Damage, supra note 214, at 2305.
265. The Notice Pleading Restoration Act provides in full: "Except as otherwise expressly provided by
an Act of Congress or by an amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which takes effect after
the enactment of this Act, a Federal court shall not dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) or (e) of the
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Iqbal is the Open Access to Courts Act that seeks to restore the Conley
standard by incorporating specific language that a complaint shall not be
dismissed "unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set
'266
of facts in support of the claim which would entitle the plaintiff to relief.
It seems odd, however, to argue that an official amendment to the Rules
is required when the Court updated its own standard. In retiring the Conley
standard and adopting a standard that seeks to dismiss unmeritorious suits
before discovery, the Court simply revised the standard it previously
created in light of changes to the realities of litigation. It is widely accepted
that the Supreme Court can overturn or deviate from its own precedent. In
fact, that is precisely what the Court did with the summary judgment
trilogy. 267 Given that the Conley standard is not required by Rule 8's
language, it seems strange to argue that once it interprets a rule, the Court is
bound by that interpretation and the only way to change the interpretation
would be to reform the Rules.
The argument that the Supreme Court is too removed from the day-today experiences of litigation is weak as well. The alternative for which
these critics advocate is an official amendment by the Rules Committee, an
entity also removed from the day-to-day experience of litigants. Moreover,
even with an official amendment to the Rules, the Supreme Court must
approve of the change. 268 If critics believe the Court is too removed from
day-to-day litigation to reinterpret pleading, there is no reason to believe it
has sufficient understanding of day-to-day litigation to approve or
disapprove of the proposed changes by the Committee. Furthermore, it
would be odd to request the Court to approve an amendment that came
about only to overrule a Supreme Court decision.
C. Plausibility Pleading Conflates the Standards for Motions to Dismiss and
Summary Judgment
In his dissent in Twombly, Justice Stevens objected that the majority's
standard for the motion to dismiss at hand conflated pleading challenges
into the summary judgment standard and imposed an evidentiary standard

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, except under the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the
United States in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957)." Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S.
1504, llCong. § 2 (2009).
266. Alleging Damage, supra note 214, at 2306.
267. See Stempel, supra note 16, at 115 (explaining that before the summary judgment trilogy, courts
viewed their role in a summary judgment motion as ascertaining whether the record showed a dispute of
factual interpretation of the existence of a non-frivolous fact).
268. See id. at 185 (explaining that after the Advisory Committee solicits comments, "the Court has the
opportunity to review the committee product and further revisit any rule changes.").
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to evaluate a motion to dismiss. 269 This argument represents a third major
objection to Twombly and Iqbal's plausibility standard: plausibility
pleading conflates the motion to dismiss and summary judgment. 270 These
critics argue that the problem with conflating the summary judgment
standard with the pleading standard is that the plausibility standard requires
plaintiffs to provide evidence that goes beyond mere allegations or
circumstantial evidence before they conduct any discovery. 271 They argue
that while it is not troublesome to require plaintiffs to make such a showing
after discovery for summary judgment, it is troublesome to insist plaintiffs
272
provide such evidence to survive a motion to dismiss.
This objection, however, is not problematic for plausibility pleading.
While it is true that the plausibility standard resembles the summary
judgment standard, simply pointing out the similarity does not itself
challenge the legitimacy of the plausibility standard. 273 Indeed it makes
sense that the two standards are related. It is a waste of the courts' and
society's resources to allow a case to proceed through discovery if it is clear
from the complaint that, even with discovery, the case will not pass
summary judgment.
The pleading standard should take into account the costs and benefits of
allowing the suit to proceed. 274 In assessing the standard applicable to cases
similar to Twombly, Richard Epstein reasons that "standard expected utility
calculations suggest that litigation should be allowed to go forward only
when the likelihood of a positive case is high enough to justify what both
the Court of Appeals... and the Supreme Court... recognized as the

269. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 586 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[It should go without saying inthe wake of
Swierkiewicz that a heightened production burden at the summary judgment stage does not translate into
a heightened pleading burden at the complaint stage.").
270. Spencer, supra note 90, at 486 ("By requiring plaintiffs to offer factual allegations that report the
factual basis for their assertions of liability and to do so in a way that makes liability plausible, the
Twombly Court effectively has moved the summary judgment evaluation up to the pleading stage.");
Ward, supra note 34, at 916-17 ("The Twombly opinion engages in a bit of sleight-of-hand to the extent
that the effect is to conflate the standards for motions to dismiss, summary judgments, and directed
verdicts."); Epstein, supra note 9, at 81 ("[Twombly] should be framed as a mini-summary judgment
case, conducted at the close of pleadings, and not as a pointless verbal disquisition on the contested
meanings of 'plausible' and 'conceivable."'); Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 92, at 833-34 n.47
("[T]he Twombly-Iqbal Court seems to have collapsed the Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56 standards of
convincingness into one.").
271. Ward, supra note 34, at 917.
272. Id.
273. A similar standard was brought critiquing the now accepted summary judgment trilogy in light of
the directed verdict standard. See Stempel, supra note 16, at 108 (arguing Liberty Lobby of the summary
judgment trilogy equated summary judgment with directed verdict).
274. Epstein, supra note 9, at 66-67 ("In general, as the costs of discovery mount, the case for
terminating litigation earlier in the cycle gets even stronger[.]").
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enormous costs of discovery in class action antitrust suits. ' ' 275

Epstein
explains that in "public information cases," like Twombly, where the
dispute does not arise from what the defendants did, but from conclusions
drawn from their actions, a motion to dismiss on the pleadings can and
276
should operate as an early "disguised" motion for summary judgment.
He, therefore, supports the position that the convergence between the
pleading standard and the summary judgment standard makes perfect sense
277
in the domain of public information cases.
Iqbal legitimately takes this reasoning a step further. The enormous cost
of discovery is a concern in almost all cases; it justifies expanding Epstein's
approach beyond public information cases. In most cases, the cost of
discovery is sufficiently high to invite settlement even in unmeritorious
cases. Thus even if the plaintiff does not "win" at trial, she walks away
with relief (whether deserved or not). The pleading standard should
account for this problem. Not only should courts dismiss cases where
public information shows that discovery will probably be fruitless, they
should also dismiss cases where common sense and reason dictate that any
interest in proceeding to discovery is significantly outweighed by the harms
of allowing the suit to proceed. If, from the non-conclusory allegations in a
complaint, reason dictates that discovery is highly unlikely to yield
evidence that supports the plaintiffs' claim, and the case presents an
unusually high cost with proceeding to discovery - such as was evident
from the influence of qualified immunity in Iqbal or the class-wide nature
of Twombly - the case should be dismissed at the pleading phase.
D. Plausibility Pleading Bars Meritorious Suits
A fourth major objection to Iqbal and Twombly's plausibility standard is
278
that plausibility pleading screens too aggressively at the pleading phase.
These critics argue it is too early to determine which are the meritorious and

275. Id. at 81; see also Hylton, supra note 209, at 54 (arguing the plaintiffs complaint should, at the
very least, plead sufficient facts to survive a summary judgment motion; otherwise the court has no basis
to assess the probability that the case will survive summary judgment).
276. Epstein, supra note 9, at 81-82.
277. Id.
278. See Spencer, supra note 90, at 483.
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which are the unmeritorious suits at the pleading phrase. 279 Screening for
meritless suits at this stage in the litigation may bar legitimate claims that
280
would have continued but for Twombly and Iqbal.
The best version of this critique is that certain cases, even when
meritorious, will be especially prone to dismissal. 281 For example, where
claims rely on information that is within the defendant's exclusive
knowledge or involve actions taken in private, a plaintiff may not be able to
plead facts sufficient to pass a motion to dismiss under the plausibility
standard. 282 In such cases, the plaintiff will have great difficulty obtaining
this information before filing. 283 Critics argue plausibility pleading creates
a sort of Catch-22 in which the plaintiff must allege more detail before
284
discovery, but the detail cannot often be obtained before discovery.
279. See id. ("[P]lausibility pleading assigns to complaints a function they cannot truly fulfill. Among
the functions that pleadings are most ineffective at fulfilling is providing courts the ability to determine
whether the plaintiffs claims are meritorious or can be proved."); see also Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 512
(holding that "[b]efore discovery has unearthed relevant facts and evidence, it may be difficult to define
the precise formulation of the required prima facie case in a particular case.").
280. See Ward, supra note 34, at 911 ("Using motions to dismiss as a mechanism to control litigation
costs, however, is an inefficient approach that may have the effect of barring legitimate, meritorious
claims that would have continued-at least through discovery-pre-Twombly.").
281. It is interesting to note that after the summary judgment trilogy, critics made the similar argument
that the new understanding of the summary judgment standard would favor defendants and prevent
meritorious cases from reaching trial. See Samuel Isaacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts
About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L. J. 73, 75 (1990) ("[S]ummary judgment fundamentally alters
the balance of power between plaintiffs and defendants by raising both the costs and risks to plaintiffs in
the pretrial phases of litigation while diminishing both for defendants."); see also Stempel, supra note
16, at 159 (arguing that courts will grant summary judgment to "trim weak or otherwise disfavored cases
from the trial docket" and that certain classes of plaintiffs will feel the brunt of the effects).
282. Bone, supra note 87, at 878-79 ("In cases like Iqbal, where the defendant has critical private
information, the plaintiff will not get past the pleading stage if she cannot ferret out enough facts before
filing to get over the merits threshold for each of the elements of her claim. As a result, strict pleading
will screen some meritorious suits, even ones with a high probability of trial success but a probability
that is not evidence at the pleading stage before access to discovery."); Spencer, supra note 90, at 481
("It is a greater shame that discovery is foreclosed for such complainants in circumstances where the
needed supporting facts lie within the exclusive possession of the defendants, which can be the case in
antitrust cases lacking direct evidence of a conspiracy."); Marcus, supra note 237, at 468.
[W]here the plaintiff is unable to provide details because only the defendant possesses such
information, no such confidence is possible. To the contrary, it may be that the defendant
has so effectively concealed his wrongdoing that the plaintiff can unearth it only with
discovery. To insist on details as a prerequisite to discovery is putting the cart before the
horse.
Id.
283. See Ward, supra note 34, at 912 ("[1]f plaintiffs' claims have merit, defendants will resist
providing evidence of their own wrongdoing, at least to the extent that procedural rules permit them to
do so. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal permits defendants to avoid the discovery process entirely.").
284. Adam N. Steinman, What is the Erie Doctrine? (And What Does it Mean for the Contemporary
Politics of Judicial Federalism?), 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 293 (2008) ("Where the primary
activity that is the basis for a lawsuit is likely to create a situation where the plaintiffs do not have access
to the factual information needed to comply with such pleading standards, those standards effectively
foreclose a plaintiffs ability to enforce its substantive rights.").
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Certain categories of cases, such as civil rights cases, antitrust violations,
product liability, consumer credit violation, and intellectual property
infringements are especially vulnerable to dismissal. 285 For instance, in
civil rights cases, critics argue that there has been a disparate impact on
286
motions to dismiss.
The critiques described above argue that plausibility pleading screens
both meritorious and unmeritorious claims. At this stage, most of the
critiques of plausibility pleading are theoretical. Twombly was decided only
three years ago, and Iqbal was decided a year ago. Critics do not yet have
sufficient data of cases interpreting Iqbal and Twombly to properly establish
that the plausibility standard adopted actually screens meritorious suits in
practice. The decisions are simply too new to establish that the standard
has yielded a problematic implementation.
To determine whether
plausibility pleading does, in fact, screen meritorious suits, a survey must
first be conducted to observe how courts apply this test. Therefore, while
this objection may eventually be legitimate, it is premature at best as studies
on the issue have yielded varied results.
A preliminary study by the Judicial Conference of the United States,
based on a search of Westlaw cases, suggests that motions to dismiss and
grants of such motions have not increased appreciably. 287 Another study by
Andrea Kuperman, a law clerk for Judge Lee H. Rosenthal of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (who chairs the
Conference Standing Rules Committee), reviewed both district and
appellate cases and concluded that there was little evidence to date that
courts were dismissing meritorious claims under the Iqbal/Twombly
288
standard.
The best evidence to support the argument that courts dismiss more
meritorious cases under the Iqbal/Twombly standard comes from a study by
Patricia Hatamyar, who reported on over 1,000 cases filed in federal district
court after Twombly and Iqbal.289 She concluded that it appears district
courts are granting motions to dismiss at a higher rate under Iqbal then they

285. Alleging Damage, supra note 213.
286. Ward, supra note 34, at 915 ('The recent spike in the number of Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss
in civil rights actions raises serious questions about disparate impact of applications of Twombly to
situations and cases not directly contemplated by the Supreme Court and echoes the concerns that were
raised about the application of Rule 11 to civil rights cases after the 1983 amendment to that rule.").
287. Alleging Damage, supra note 213, at 2305.
288. Id. at 2305-06.
289. Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading:Do Twombly and Iqbal Matter Empirically?,59 AM.
U. REV. 553, 555 (2010).
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did under Conley or even Twombly in certain categories of cases. 290 Her
study shows Iqbal and Twombly appear to have the greatest impact in six
broad categories of cases: contracts, torts, civil rights (including
constitutional violations and employment discrimination suits), intellectual
property, labor, and "statutory actions" (including antitrust, RICO,
environmental cases, and consumer credit claims). 291 In tort cases,
successful motions to dismiss increased from 40% under Conley, to 46%
after Twombly, to 52% after Iqbal.292 The percentage of civil rights cases
dismissed rose from 50% under Conley to 53% under Twombly, to 58%
after Iqbal.293 Most significantly, dismissal of statutory actions fell from
294
53% under Conley, to 50% under Twombly, then rose to 72% after Iqbal.
Although the studies above do not show consistent results, it would not
be surprising if studies eventually showed courts granted motions to dismiss
more readily under the more demanding new standard than under the more
lenient old standard. In fact, this is exactly what happened after the
summary judgment trilogy came down. 295 However, such a finding does
not itself show that plausibility pleading is problematic. Without evidence
that the dismissed suits were meritorious, such results may simply mean
that the plausibility standard is doing its job; that is, even if it is true that a
greater percentage of cases are dismissed at this stage, it is unclear that the
cases dismissed are meritorious.
Kuperman's report, for example,
concluded, "while it seems likely that Twombly and Iqbal have resulted in
screening out some claims that might have survived before those cases, it is
much more difficult to determine whether meritorious claims are being
screened under the framework or whether the new framework is effectively
working to sift out only those cases that have no plausible basis for
proceeding. ' 296 One means of determining the effectiveness of plausibility
pleading would be to assess how many of the marginal complaints (that
were not dismissed under Conley, but would have been dismissed under
plausibility pleading) later failed at the summary judgment stage. If this

290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 597-603.
Id. at 605 fig.4.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id. at 603-10.

295. See Brooke D. Coleman, The Celotex Initial Burden Standard and an Opportunity to "Revivify"

Rule 56, 32 S. ILL. U. L. J.295, 295 (2008) ("The percentage of federal cases ended by summary
judgment increased from 3.7% in 1975 to 7.7% in 2000."). But see Joe S. Cecil, Rebecca N. Eyre, Dean
Miletich & David Rindskopf, A QuarterCentury of Summary Judgment Practice in Six FederalDistrict
Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861 (2007) (concluding that the Court's summary judgment

trilogy confirmed a trend toward more aggressive use of summary judgment already prevalent in lower
federal courts).
296. Alleging Damage, supra note 213, at 2306.
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number is high, then plausibility pleading provides an efficient screening
mechanism.
Given that there is no consistent data showing the Iqbal/Twombly
standard actually screens out more meritorious cases than notice pleading,
the best critique of plausibility pleading is that, in theory, plausibility
pleading may screen some meritorious suits. However, some minimal
reforms to plausibility pleading can end the concern.
The first concern with the argument that plausibility pleading will bar
suits in which certain information is within the defendant's exclusive
knowledge is the fact that a plaintiff with a legitimate case (who is not
bringing suit just to extort a settlement) at the very least believes she has a
case. Moreover, if her attorney is in compliance with the federal rules and
the rules of ethics, the attorney believes that, based on the information
provided, the plaintiff's case has merit. 297 Thus, even if the precise details
are in the defendant's exclusive knowledge, the plaintiff should typically
know enough information to plead the necessary facts for an attorney to
reasonably believe that the plaintiff has a case based on the information
provided.
In the rare situation that the defendant has the exclusive knowledge of
facts necessary to plead a plausible case when the plaintiff and her attorney
know the claim is legitimate, presuit discovery provides a solution.
Allowing presuit discovery in cases that involve private knowledge or
information exclusively in the defendant's hands would give the plaintiff an
opportunity to obtain the missing information and show that her complaint
has merit.
E. The Plausibility Standard is Too Subjective
A final objection to plausibility pleading is that in its application,
plausibility pleading will tend toward a high level of judicial subjectivity.
The Iqbal Court stated, determining plausibility is a "context-specific task
that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and
common sense." 298 The objection is that because different judges have
different experiences and viewpoints as to what is reasonable, the
determination of whether or not a complaint is plausible is bound to be
297. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(b) (stating that by presenting a pleading to the court, an attorney certifies
"the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous
argument[.]"); MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.1 (2008) ("A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so
that is not frivolous[.]").
298. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
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arbitrary. 299 Professor Steven Burbank predicted Iqbal will be "a blank
check for federal judges to get rid of cases they disfavor."30 0 Other critics
have expressed concern that judges will use the plausibility standard as a
means of reducing their caseload and perhaps even deny litigants their right
30 1
to a jury trial in violation of the Seventh Amendment.
It is true that the plausibility standard for pleading entails a certain
degree of subjectivity in determining whether a complaint's allegations are
unreasonable. Determining plausibility will depend, to a certain extent, on
the judge's understanding of how the world works. 30 2 However, inductive
reasoning--drawing inferences from common sense-is a central feature of
30 3
litigation to which judges are already accustomed.
The Rules give judges a great deal of discretionary power over
litigation. 30 4 One of the areas where judges have a great deal of discretion
is over discovery matters. Plausibility pleading allows judges to apply the
same common sense used in deciding discovery matters to determine
whether or not a complaint should proceed to discovery. The discretion in
plausibility pleading is, therefore, just an extension of judicial discretion
30 5
over discovery.
The suggested alternative toward limiting discovery abuses is judicial
regulation; however, if we do not trust the judges to implement plausibility
pleading fairly, there is no reason to believe they will be fair in the their
stricter regulation of discovery. To make matters worse, if we suspect
judges will dismiss meritorious cases to lessen their caseloads or because
they dislike certain kinds of cases, we should suspect they would maintain
this same bias at other points in the proceeding (perhaps even in their
299. Surbin, supra note 63, at 390 ('The new 'plausibility' test, to be applied after a judge strikes
allegations that he or she thinks are conclusory, is an invitation to ad hoc decision making.").
300. Adam Liptak, SIDEBAR: Case About 9/11 Case Could Lead to a Broad Shift on Civil Lawsuits,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2009 (quoting Professor Burbank).

301. Surbin, supra note 63, at 391.
302. See Hartnett, supra note 143, at 498 ("What strikes a judge as plausible depends on the judge's
sense of what is (to use the Twombly Court's term) 'natural').
303. Id. (describing the relationship between inductive reasoning and legal decision-making).
304. Surbin, supra note 63, at 391.
There is discretion at every turn in the open-textured Federal Rules, from what constitutes
the statement of a claim for which relief can be granted;, [sic] to what constitutes conduct,
transaction, or occurrence (as these concepts manifest themselves in different rules); to what
is impairment as a practical matter in necessary party jurisdiction; to when discovery has
become so onerous that judicial curtailment is in order; to when a Rule 11 sanction should
be imposed; to what is a lack of sufficiency of potential evidence for summary judgment
purposes.
Id.
305. See FED. R. Civ. P. 16(a), (26)(b); see also Epstein, supra note 141, at 10 ("In the end, of course,
the trial judge must always retain some discretion on discovery matters.").
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ultimate decisions at bench trials). Moreover, if trial judges abuse their
discretion by dismissing cases just to lessen their caseload, we should
expect appellate judges to reverse the improper dismissals.
While the plausibility pleading standard involves the judge's common
sense, judicial common sense is not the only consideration in determining
plausibility. The "reasonable" standard in determining whether a claim is
plausible requires assessing the context of the complaint as a whole, not
simply according to the judge's personal opinion of how the world works.
The Twombly Court, for example, did not rest its evaluation of the
complaint on only its common sense; rather, the Court looked to the history
of the telecommunications industry and what was economically reasonable
behavior in that industry.
Dismissal of suits under the plausibility standard does not offend the
Constitution. Before plausibility pleading, courts imposed much more
stringent pleading standards (including code pleading) that were not
considered contrary to the Seventh Amendment. Moreover, judges already
take certain cases away from juries in appropriate circumstances. In
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.30 6 the Supreme Court reasoned,
"[i]n numerous contexts [including Daubert,judgment as a matter of law,
and summary judgment], gate-keeping judicial determinations prevent
submission of claims to a jury's judgment without violating the Seventh
307
Amendment."
CONCLUSION

Twombly and Iqbal unquestionably represent a change to the pleading
30 8
world. In thirty-two months, Twombly garnered 22,980 judicial citations.
By contrast, Erie only generated 13,546 citations in its first seventy-two
years. 30 9 Despite these many references, it remains unclear which
understanding of plausibility pleading the Court will ultimately accept or
how lower courts will interpret Iqbal and Twombly.
While some
understandings of plausibility pleading are subject to the objections
explained above, the approach toward plausibility pleading adopted by this
306. 551 U.S. 308 (2007); see also Herrmann et al., supra note 77, at 158 ("[l]t does not offend the
Constitution to weed out implausible claims before trial. Summary judgment was upheld against a
Seventh Amendment challenge ninety years ago .... Directed verdict survived a similar challenge ....
There's nothing new here.").
307. 551 U.S. 308, 327 n.8 (2007).
308. Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 92, at 2 n.4 (measuring reference to Twombly on a Westlaw
KeyCite run on January 15, 2010).
309. Id.
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article addresses many of the concerns raised while balancing the interest of
investing judicial resources in meritorious suits with curbing the expenses
of discovery and frivolous suits.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were written in an era in which
litigation was far simpler than it is today. Given the changes to the system
since then, some of the underlying assumptions behind the reformers'
visions of the Rules no longer apply. Because of the extreme cost of
discovery, even unmeritorious cases can have settlement zones; Because of
the risk of aggregate litigation, defendants may settle unmeritorious cases to
avoid exposure to a class action; and because of the prevalence of
settlement, most cases are no longer resolved in a single trial on the merits.
In an ideal world with ideal resources it might be preferable to have true
notice pleading and allow all cases to proceed through discovery.
Nevertheless, today's realities require a balancing of resources. Our courts
do not have the resources to bring all cases to trial and litigants do not have
the resources to follow through with costly discovery and costly trial.
Given this reality, plausibility pleading strikes an appropriate balance
between focusing on merit and accounting for reality.
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